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Licensing Knowledge 
Claudia E. Haupt* 
When professionals give advice, they disseminate professional 
knowledge to their clients. Professional advice is valuable to clients 
because they gain access to a body of knowledge they do not otherwise 
possess. To preserve the accuracy, and hence the value, of this knowledge 
transfer, the First Amendment should protect professional speech 
against state interference that seeks to alter the content of professional 
advice in a way that contradicts professional knowledge. But before 
professionals can give professional advice, they are routinely subject to 
licensing by the state. This seemingly creates a tension between state 
involvement in professional licensing and protection against state 
involvement in professional speech.  
This Article provides a theoretical framework to reconcile 
professional speech protection with professional licensing. Under this 
theory, the interests underlying First Amendment protection of 
professional speech and those underlying state licensing are the same: 
preserving the reliability of expert knowledge by guarding professionals’ 
competence and protecting the dissemination of reliable professional 
advice to the client.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Professional licensing is under attack. Before professionals may 
dispense advice to their clients, they routinely have to obtain a license 
to practice, subjecting them to state regulation. But efforts to 
deregulate professional licensing that enlist the First Amendment as a 
new deregulatory weapon of choice are underway.1 These challenges 
have created marked judicial disagreement on the First Amendment 
implications of licensing,2 reflecting the underdeveloped theoretical 
basis of professional advice-giving. 
 
 1. Cf. David E. Bernstein, The Due Process Right to Pursue a Lawful Occupation: A Brighter 
Future Ahead?, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 287, 289 n.9 (2016) (“An emerging issue . . . is whether the 
First Amendment provides robust protection against occupational restrictions that impinge on 
freedom of speech . . . .”); Clark Neily, Beating Rubber-Stamps into Gavels: A Fresh Look at 
Occupational Freedom, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 304, 306 (2016) (arguing that “increased skepticism 
toward the rational basis test, and the collision of occupational licensing with more highly 
scrutinized realms of speech regulation and antitrust, have created both opportunities and an 
inclination for judges to reconsider the traditional evaluation of occupational licensing”). 
 2. Compare Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding 
D.C. tour guide licensing requirement to violate the First Amendment), with Kagan v. City of New 
Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1403 (2015) (holding New 
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Professional speech should receive robust First Amendment 
protection. Dispensing professional advice within the professional-
client relationship ought to remain free from state interference that 
seeks to prescribe its content in a way that contradicts professional 
knowledge. A doctor’s advice, for example, should reflect the insights of 
the medical profession rather than a state legislature’s opposing view.3 
I have argued elsewhere that the First Amendment provides a shield 
against such state interference.4 At the same time, state licensing 
remains an important regulatory tool to prevent “quacks” from giving 
bad advice.5 
The new First Amendment–based attacks on licensing suggest 
that a tension exists between state regulation of the professions and 
speech protection. Permitting state involvement in licensing while at 
the same time prohibiting intrusive state involvement in professional 
speech presents a puzzle that this Article addresses in its theoretical 
and doctrinal dimensions. So doing, it articulates a defense of 
professional licensing against First Amendment challenges and 
reconciles licensing with robust First Amendment protection for 
professional speech. 
 
Orleans tour guide licensing requirement to be permissible under the First Amendment). See also 
Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354, 365–70 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that the provision of the 
Psychologists’ Licensing Act governing “psychological services to individuals, groups, 
organizations, or the public” was an overbroad restriction on free speech as related to offers to 
provide such services without commercial purpose); Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1197–98 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (upholding Florida licensing requirement for interior designers against First 
Amendment challenge); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of 
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1056 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding California licensing requirement for 
mental health professionals against First Amendment challenge). 
 3. See, e.g., Rick Rojas, Arizona Orders Doctors to Say Abortions with Drugs May Be 
Reversible, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1DpDo0Q [https://perma.cc/7MHN-W55A] 
(“Arizona . . . became the first state to pass a law requiring doctors who perform drug-induced 
abortions to tell women that the procedure may be reversible, an assertion that most doctors say 
is wrong.”); see also Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1319 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that the recordkeeping, inquiry and antiharassment provisions of the Florida Firearm 
Owners’ Privacy Act violated the First Amendment and that the antidiscrimination provision was 
constitutional). But see Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (upholding a state law requiring doctors to inform patients seeking an abortion of an 
increased risk of suicide to obtain informed consent). 
 4. See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238 (2016) (offering 
a theory of First Amendment protection for professional speech based on an understanding of the 
professions as knowledge communities). 
 5. Id. at 1277–84 (discussing licensing as permissible regulation). 
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Courts6 and scholars7 have linked First Amendment questions 
of professional speech protection to the permissibility of licensing. What 
is still missing from the debate, however, is a firm theoretical basis to 
defend professional licensing against deregulatory undertakings that 
seek to enlist the First Amendment in an effort to curb state regulation 
of commercial—including professional—activities.  
A theory of professional speech based on an understanding of the 
professions as knowledge communities aligns the interests underlying 
professional speech protection from state interference on the one hand 
and those underlying state involvement in professional licensing on the 
other. The respective interests, I submit, are the same: preserving the 
reliability of expert knowledge by guarding professionals’ competence, 
and protecting the dissemination of reliable professional advice to the 
client. Therefore, the First Amendment cannot in a theoretically and 
doctrinally coherent manner be used as a deregulatory device against 
professional licensing.  
This Article plays out against the larger jurisprudential 
backdrop that is the current debate over the deregulatory use of the 
First Amendment in pursuit of a laissez faire, Lochner-style market.8 
 
 6. See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 
(2018):  
All that is required to make something a “profession,” according to these courts, is that 
it involves personalized services and requires a professional license from the State. But 
that gives the States unfettered power to reduce a group’s First Amendment rights by 
simply imposing a licensing requirement. States cannot choose the protection that 
speech receives under the First Amendment, as that would give them a powerful tool to 
impose “invidious discrimination of disfavored subjects.;  
King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 319 (D.N.J. 2013): 
[T]here is a more fundamental problem with [the argument that professional counseling 
is speech], because taken to its logical end, it would mean that any regulation of 
professional counseling necessarily implicates fundamental First Amendment free 
speech rights, and therefore would need to withstand heightened scrutiny to be 
permissible. Such a result runs counter to the longstanding principle that a state 
generally may enact laws rationally regulating professionals, including those providing 
medicine and mental health services. 
 7. See, e.g., Robert Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”: Professional Licensing and the First 
Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885 (2000) (discussing licensing as a regulation of professional 
advice); Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
FORUM 165 (2015) (discussing the use of licensing to regulate occupational speech); Vikram Amar, 
Licensing Regulations Are Not a Free-Speech Issue, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Aug. 20, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/20/when-do-doctors-have-the-right-to-speak/ 
licensing-regulations-are-not-a-free-speech-issue [https://perma.cc/H5VZ-TL6F] (arguing that 
professional licensing regulations should not trigger review under the First Amendment). 
 8. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2460 (2018) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority has chosen the winners by turning the First Amendment 
into a sword, and using it against workaday economic and regulatory policy.”); NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2383 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Using the First Amendment to strike down economic and social 
laws . . . will, for the American public, obscure, not clarify, the true value of protecting freedom of 
speech.”); see also C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 
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In the professional context in particular, such developments would be 
extremely problematic. In contrast to the commercial realm, where the 
free flow of information is at stake, professionals deal in a specific kind 
of information—namely, advice based on professional knowledge.9 
What is good professional advice, in turn, is determined by the 
knowledge community rather than the market.10 Thus, even if the First 
Amendment were to justify deregulation in the commercial context 
generally11—which I doubt, but will not explore within the confines of 
 
981, 990–94 (2009) (arguing that commercial speech should be subject to regulation due to its 
relation to market transactions); Julie Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1119, 1157–58 (2015) (describing how the First Amendment has been used to advance 
economic interests); Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2583, 2588 (2008) (arguing against the expansive protection of commercial speech, especially 
as applied to for-profit corporations); Post & Shanor, supra note 7, at 167 (“[T]he First Amendment 
has become a powerful engine of constitutional deregulation.”); Robert Post, The Constitutional 
Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (“Nothing could be more damaging to 
the First Amendment than to equate it with a specific economic perspective, and in this way to 
transform it into a mere “basis for reviewing economic regulations.”); Amanda Shanor, The New 
Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 137 (“Courts’ growing protection of commercial speech threatens 
to revive a sort of Lochnerian constitutional economic deregulation . . . .”); Morgan N. Weiland, 
Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1454 (2017) (“By conceptualizing corporate and listeners’ interests as 
aligned because both benefit from deregulation, the Court has developed a tradition in which 
corporate interests are always vindicated while listeners’ interests are not.”). But see Jonathan H. 
Adler, Persistent Threats to Commercial Speech, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 289, 316 (2016) (“[C]ommercial 
speech can pose a threat to established economic interests . . . .”); Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. 
Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 378 (2017) (arguing that broad 
First Amendment protections are important in the marketplace). 
 Indicative of a larger trend, scholars explore the Lochnerization of the First Amendment 
beyond commercial speech. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 
100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 572 (2015) (“[R]enewed focus in conservative political thought on 
limiting government interference in the marketplace has begun to affect mainstream conservative 
legal thought.”); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1915, 1917 (2016) (explaining that First Amendment Lochnerism has affected “campaign 
financiers, food and drug companies, right-to-work activists, and religious employers”); Elizabeth 
Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (2015) (“[C]ourts increasingly 
incorporate the central premises of Lochner into religious liberty doctrine.”). For a popular press 
account, see Adam Liptak, How Conservatives Weaponized the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (June 
30, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2ID0Wov [https://perma.cc/9HKG-YD4S] (“Conservative groups . . . have 
used the First Amendment to justify unlimited campaign spending, discrimination against gay 
couples and attacks on the regulation of tobacco, pharmaceuticals and guns.”). 
 9. Cf. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1283 (stating that the First Amendment may be used to 
protect “the individual professional’s opinion”). 
 10. See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 678 
(2017) (“The advice-giving function of the individual professional is thus tied back to the range of 
defensible opinions within the knowledge community.”). 
 11. For competing views, see Bernstein, supra note 1, at 295 (advocating for “[t]he right to 
pursue an occupation free from arbitrary government action”); Neily, supra note 1, at 312 
(criticizing “the dubious jurisprudential foundation upon which the occupational licensing doctrine 
rests”); and Amanda Shanor, Business Licensing and Constitutional Liberty, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 
314, 314 (2016) (“[T]he Constitution is increasingly being invoked as a trump against certain types 
of economic regulation.”). 
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this Article—the underlying considerations, as I will argue here, do not 
apply in the professional context.  
In making that argument, this Article unpacks the distinctive 
nature of professional speech. Several key features distinguish 
professional speech from speech in public discourse and from 
commercial speech.12 Professional speech takes place within the 
confines of the professional-client relationship. In light of the 
characteristics defining this social relationship, two strands of current 
First Amendment scholarship concerning questions of listener interests 
and speaker equality are especially salient. Both constitute the flip side 
of dominant First Amendment theory as it applies to public discourse, 
and both remain generally underexplored even though they are of 
foundational importance in the context of professional speech.  
The predominant perspective in First Amendment doctrine 
tends to focus primarily on speaker interests.13 But in the professional 
context, this focus is misplaced. Likewise, there is a strong presumption 
of speaker equality that pervades our understanding of the First 
Amendment.14 The reasons underlying professional speech protection, 
however, run counter to these assumptions. The very purpose of 
professional speech is to provide useful advice to the client. A focus 
solely on the speaker is misguided because within the professional-
client relationship, the perspective of the listener—who receives access 
to knowledge from the speaker—is essential.15 Moreover, the 
professional deploying her expert knowledge within the professional-
client relationship affirmatively is not equal to other, nonprofessional 
speakers, and her professional advice is therefore not to be regarded as 
 
 12. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1254–58 (distinguishing professional speech from private 
speech in public discourse and from government speech); id. at 1264–68 (distinguishing 
professional speech and commercial speech). 
 13. See, e.g., Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First 
Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31, 52 (2016) (“Many think of the First Amendment as 
safeguarding the interests of speakers, especially the lonely individual speaker of conscience.”); 
Post & Shanor, supra note 7, at 170 (“Ordinary First Amendment doctrine . . . focuses on the rights 
of speakers, not listeners.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231–32 (2015) (invalidating municipal 
sign ordinance and holding that content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny); 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010) (striking down restrictions of independent 
political expenditures based on the identity of the speaker, stating that “the First Amendment 
generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity”); see also 
ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE, at xi (2012) (“We have interpreted the First Amendment 
to mean that every person has an equal right to speak as he or she thinks right.”).  
 15. Cf. Norton, supra note 13, at 83 (discussing “professionals’ speech to their patients” as a 
listener-centered relationship and asserting that “a listener-centered approach supports the 
protection of speech in these relationships that furthers listeners’ First Amendment interests, 
while permitting the regulation of speech that frustrates those interests”). 
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just another opinion.16 These considerations make the First 
Amendment a poor vehicle to challenge professional licensing. In fact, 
quite to the contrary, the justifications underlying professional 
licensing and professional speech protection, as the remainder of this 
Article demonstrates, largely align.  
To be clear, the argument is not that the First Amendment 
requires professional licensing as a constitutional matter.17 Rather, the 
argument is that the First Amendment does not prohibit professional 
licensing. It thus cannot be used as a tool against state regulation that 
requires professionals to be licensed. The constitutional basis for such 
regulations comfortably rests in the police powers of the states.18 
Doctrinally, these regulations are thus subject to rational basis review 
rather than First Amendment strict scrutiny or, under the commercial 
speech doctrine, intermediate scrutiny. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the traditional 
justifications for state licensing and presents the main critiques of these 
justifications, including critiques based on economic interests, 
character and fitness, and competence. On closer inspection, they are 
best understood as efforts to recalibrate existing licensing regimes. This 
Part then highlights the new, First Amendment–based critique of 
licensing that raises the stakes significantly by questioning the 
constitutionality of licensing. Finally, it addresses the object of licensing 
and concludes that ensuring the professional’s competence to serve the 
client’s interests within the professional-client advice-giving 
relationship is the most relevant basis for licensing.  
 
 16. Note that the existence of a professional-client relationship is key. See POST, supra note 
14, at 44 (“Within public discourse, traditional First Amendment doctrine systematically 
transmutes claims of expert knowledge into assertions of opinion.”). 
 17. Licensing of clergy, in particular the jailing of Baptist ministers in Virginia for preaching 
without licenses, is at the root of religious freedom in the United States. See Michael McConnell, 
Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2105, 2119–20 (2003); id. at 2164–65 (discussing England’s Act of Toleration, which 
expanded the right to preach freely in the American colonies and served as a precursor to the First 
Amendment). The clergy is generally considered one of the three paradigmatic professions, 
alongside law and medicine. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1248–49. However, in light of the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment, I explicitly exclude the clergy from my discussion.  
 A different rationale for excluding the clergy is given by Walter Gellhorn, who notes: “After 
examining the roster of who must receive official permission to function, a cynic might conclude 
that virtually the only people who remain unlicensed in at least one of the United States are 
clergymen and university professors, presumably because they are nowhere taken seriously.” 
Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 6 (1976). 
 18. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people.”); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872) (police power extends “to the 
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all 
property within the State”). 
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Part II offers a descriptive-analytical account of the specific 
character of expert knowledge. Drawing on insights from sociology and 
science and technology studies—fields traditionally concerned with 
understanding knowledge and the professions—it provides an 
assessment of the sociological reality of how knowledge is produced and 
disseminated by professionals and thus made useful to clients. So doing, 
it first explores the distinction between information and knowledge. It 
then turns to the societal role of expert knowledge communicated 
through professional advice. Expert knowledge is based on inequality 
between professionals and nonprofessionals, and hence might be 
considered fundamentally “undemocratic.” Yet, this very characteristic 
makes professional knowledge—and professional advice based on it—
valuable to the client and, by extension, to society at large. Exploring 
these knowledge-centered societal benefits, it offers a perspective 
traditionally underexplored in First Amendment theory.19  
Part III shifts to a normative perspective, considering more fully 
the specific interests at stake. It examines listener interests and 
speaker inequality within the professional-client relationship as 
features distinctive from public discourse and in contrast to the 
normative assumptions underlying public discourse. It then turns to the 
normative dimension of speaker inequality, bringing the First 
Amendment values underlying professional speech into conversation 
with the values underlying the fiduciary relationship between 
professionals and clients. Because fiduciary duties are anathema to our 
understanding of public discourse, they remain generally overlooked in 
First Amendment theory.20 
Part IV offers a reassessment of professional licensing in light of 
the concept of the professions as knowledge communities along two 
axes. First, it demonstrates from a First Amendment perspective that 
professional licensing and the values underlying speech protection align 
in the interest of ensuring competence. It outlines the doctrinal 
implications of the theory and its interactions with the professional 
advice-giving framework. Second, it argues that the states’ police 
powers offer ample room for recalibrating existing professional 
 
 19. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 902 (2010) 
(“Yet although factual truth is important, surprisingly little of the free speech tradition is 
addressed directly to the question of the relationship between a regime of freedom of speech and 
the goal of increasing public knowledge of facts or decreasing public belief in false factual 
propositions.”). One notable exception is Post’s theory of expertise and democracy, see POST, supra 
note 14, upon which my analysis builds, see infra Section II.C. 
 20. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1183, 1217 (2016) (“This is the opposite of the model of independent, autonomous individuals 
presupposed by the model of public discourse.”). 
Haupt_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/31/2019 1:27 AM 
2019] LICENSING KNOWLEDGE 509 
licensing regimes in light of the interplay of professional expertise, 
public expectations, and the interest in harm avoidance.  
The First Amendment, to borrow loosely from Alexander 
Meiklejohn, “is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness.”21 
Regulating the professions through professional licensing requirements 
does not contradict the values served by the First Amendment in the 
professional context. Ultimately, the juxtaposition of professional 
licensing and the First Amendment in antilicensing litigation is 
strategically innovative but theoretically unsound. There may be good 
reasons to question the scope and design of current professional 
licensing requirements. But the First Amendment poses no 
constitutional barrier to professional licensing. 
I. PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
Processes of professionalization bring with them the advent of 
licensing regimes. Whether among lawyers in medieval England,22 
physicians in eighteenth-century Germany,23 or across various 
professional groups in the United States,24 professionalization 
generates exclusive claims to expertise, which in turn routinely results 
in calls for state intervention to establish admissions regulations or 
licensing regimes.25  
We live in an era of ever-expanding professional licensing.26 
That general trend, to be sure, is not particularly new. Henry 
 
 21. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27 
(1948). 
 22. See, e.g., Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of 
Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) (“[O]ne sees the adoption of competence and character 
based admission standards . . . .”). 
 23. See, e.g., Thomas Broman, Rethinking Professionalization: Theory, Practice, and 
Professional Ideology in Eighteenth-Century German Medicine, 67 J. MOD. HIST. 835, 858–62 
(1995) (claiming that licensing brought “a new sense of professionalism” to the medical profession); 
id. at 839 (“Most significant . . . was the creation of state medical boards . . . which established a 
separate licensing examination for admission to medical practice.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Harold J. Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, 70 AM. J. SOC. 137, 
137 (1964) (stating that the U.S. “labor force as a whole is in one way or another becoming 
professionalized”). 
 25. See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 11 (“[R]estricting access is the real purpose, and not 
merely a side effect, of many if not most successful campaigns to institute licensing schemes”); 
Henry Paul Monaghan, The Constitution and Occupational Licensing in Massachusetts, 41 B.U. 
L. REV. 157, 166 (1961) (“[T]he prime impetus for the creation of a state board to administer 
standards for entry into an occupation emanates from the occupational group itself . . . .”).  
 26. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Job Licenses in Spotlight as Uber Rises, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 
2015), http://nyti.ms/1zt0vHe [https://perma.cc/8GWL-YJNS] (reporting on various studies of 
licensing, including Morris M. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION: HAMILTON PROJECT (Mar. 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/06/THP_KleinerDiscPaper_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBZ6-LFUV]; and Dick M. Carpenter 
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Monaghan noted in an article published in 1961: “The continuous 
growth of the occupational license as a method for restricting entry into 
an occupation is, in its own way, an arresting social phenomenon. 
Occupation after occupation is withdrawn from unrestricted access by 
requiring a license as a prerequisite to entrance.”27 But a half century 
later, the scope far exceeds previous licensing requirements. 
By serving as a prerequisite to practicing one’s occupation, 
licensing constitutes a “significant control over free occupational 
entry.”28 Only those individuals who exhibit “a certain minimum 
proficiency” receive licenses. This mechanism necessarily means that 
there is no unlimited access to professions subject to licensing.29 And 
although unlimited entry may be justifiably rejected for some 
professions based on certain prerequisites of expertise,30 limiting entry 
may also be designed to exclude otherwise qualified individuals. On this 
point, a parallel reading of the Slaughter-House Cases31 and Bradwell v. 
Illinois32 is instructive. 
 
II, Lisa Knepper, Angela C. Erickson & John K. Ross, License to Work: A National Study of Burdens 
from Occupational Licensing, INST. FOR JUST. (May 2012), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/04/licensetowork1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NKR-Q63E]. 
 27. Monaghan, supra note 25, at 164; see also Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 6: 
Possibly the founding fathers knew of restrictions in some of the new American states 
on the practices of law and medicine. They would, however, have been aghast to learn 
that in many parts of this country today aspiring bee keepers, embalmers, lightning rod 
salesmen, septic tank cleaners, taxidermists, and tree surgeons must obtain official 
approval before seeking the public’s patronage. 
(footnote omitted). 
 28. Monaghan, supra note 25, at 158. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889) (upholding licensing requirement to 
practice medicine, concluding that “[t]he law of West Virginia was intended to secure such skill 
and learning in the profession of medicine that the community might trust with confidence those 
receiving a license under authority of the state”); see also Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 169–70 
(1923) (upholding licensing requirement for dentists). 
 31. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872) (defining extent of police powers). 
 32. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872) (rejecting challenge of qualified female applicant’s 
denial of a license to practice law under the Fourteenth Amendment). The concurrence elaborates:  
It is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations founded on nature, reason, 
and experience for the due admission of qualified persons to professions and callings 
demanding special skill and confidence. This fairly belongs to the police power of the 
State; and, in my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission 
of woman, it is within the province of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, 
and callings shall be filled and discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those 
energies and responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are presumed to 
predominate in the sterner sex. 
Id. at 142 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
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Licensing requirements are based on the states’ police powers to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens,33 and they are 
routinely justified by invoking protection of the public as the underlying 
rationale. The rationales for regulation across professions are similar, 
though they are not typically “precisely the same as those underlying 
many typical forms of health, safety, and economic regulation.”34 That 
is to say, the “protecting the public” rationale for professional licensing 
can be fuzzy. One important consequence is that licensing regimes are 
often insufficiently calibrated. An improved approach would move away 
from the generic “protecting the public” rationale toward a more clearly 
defined and justified regulatory objective: ensuring the reliability of 
expert knowledge for the benefit of the client by ascertaining the 
competence of the professional advice-giver and tying the professional’s 
advice to the body of knowledge generated by the professional 
knowledge community.35 But that does not mean that licensing is not—
and ought not be—permissible.  
A. Traditional Justifications for Professional Licensing  
The Supreme Court noted in 1889 in Dent v. West Virginia: “No 
one has a right to practice medicine without having the necessary 
qualifications of learning and skill; and the statute only requires that 
whoever assumes, by offering the community his services as a 
physician, that he possess such learning and skill, shall present 
evidence of it by a certificate or license from a body designated by the 
state as competent to judge of his qualifications.”36 Expertise and 
licensing are thus coupled. 
In the context of legal advice, while acknowledging the need for 
affordable access to legal services, the American Bar Association’s 
(“ABA”) position regarding nonlawyer providers has rejected “open[ing] 
the practice of law to unschooled, unregulated nonlawyers” primarily 
with a view to potential “grave harm to clients.”37 Though many legal 
 
 33. See, e.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 191 (1898) (concerning medical licenses); 
Dent, 129 U.S. at 122 (discussing medical licensing “conditions imposed by the state for the 
protection of society”).  
 34. Rose, supra note 22, at 3 (focusing on the legal profession).  
 35. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1248–54 (explaining the role of professional knowledge 
communities). 
 36. 129 U.S. at 123. 
 37. Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the Public? 
Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2607 (2014) (quoting 
William T. Robinson, Legal Help for the Poor: The View from the A.B.A., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/opinion/legal-help-for-the-poor-the-view-from-the-aba.html 
[https://perma.cc/VG5H-JCX9]). 
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issues may look fairly straightforward, they likely “involve myriad legal 
rights and responsibilities. If the case is not handled by a professional 
with appropriate legal training, a person can suffer serious long-term 
consequences . . .”38    
This justification seems fairly intuitive, and it is easily 
translatable to other professions. It also resonates with the public’s 
expectations toward providers of professional services. As one observer 
remarked,  
Sometimes professional licenses make sense, ensuring decent standards of health and 
safety. I’m reassured that if I ever need brain surgery, the doctor performing it will have 
been recognized by the profession to be up to the task. We don’t want to return to the 19th 
century, when barbers pulled teeth and freelance doctors with no certification peddled 
miraculous cures.39 
Accordingly, states establish licensing systems for various 
professions. When challenged, courts have upheld them by relying on 
traditional justifications. Consider, for example, National Ass’n for the 
Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Board of Psychology, 
decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2000.40 
The state of California has regulated psychology as a profession since 
1958.41 Initially, only the title “psychologist” was protected, but there 
was no definition of what “the practice of psychology” entailed.42 In light 
of “the actual and potential consumer harm that can result from the 
unlicensed, unqualified or incompetent practice of psychology,” 
however, the state created the Psychology Licensing Law.43 The state 
legislature relied on the state’s police powers, reasoning “that the 
practice of psychology in California affect[ed] the public health, safety, 
and welfare and [was] to be subject to regulation and control in the 
public interest to protect the public from the unauthorized and 
unqualified practice of psychology.”44  
The statute defines the profession,45 sets forth a licensing 
requirement, and defines the services rendered.46 It also establishes 
certain educational requirements as a prerequisite for obtaining a 
license.47 Moreover, the statute allows other professionals to engage in 
 
38. Id.  
 39. Porter, supra note 26. 
 40. 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 41. Id. at 1047. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (quoting CAL. BD. OF PSYCHOLOGY, SUNSET REVIEW REPORT). 
 44. Id. (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2900 (West 2018)).  
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. (summarizing education, work experience, and admissions exam requirements for 
licensing).  
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“work of a psychological nature consistent with the laws governing their 
respective professions” as long as “they do not hold themselves out to 
the public as psychologists.”48 At issue in this particular case were 
provisions concerning psychoanalysts.49 Several individuals and an 
organization, not licensed under California law but intending to 
practice psychoanalysis in California, challenged the licensing scheme 
on Fourteenth and First Amendment grounds.50 The Ninth Circuit held 
that it was constitutional under both.51  
With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process and equal protection challenge, the court held “that there is no 
fundamental right to choose a mental health professional with specific 
training.”52 Since the licensing requirement “neither utilizes a suspect 
classification nor implicates a fundamental right,” the court subjected 
it to rational basis review.53 Plaintiffs argued that there was no rational 
basis to require additional training prerequisites in order to obtain a 
license, that there was no rational basis for exempting certain 
professionals, and that the entire licensing scheme was “unnecessary 
and ineffective” and overly restrictive.54 The court rejected all of these 
arguments and in so doing made the—in light of contemporary 
developments, perhaps overconfident55—observation that “the Lochner 
era has long passed.”56  
Regarding the First Amendment challenge, the plaintiffs argued 
that psychoanalysis—the “talking cure”—is pure speech and as such 
deserves First Amendment protection.57 The court, however, noted that 
the state’s police power allows regulation and licensing of professionals, 
particularly when issues of public health and safety are involved.58 
 The professions discussed so far—medicine, law, and 
psychology—suggest an important connection between the 
permissibility of a licensing requirement and the nature of the 
occupational activity to be regulated.59 There is a broad range of 
 
 48. Id. at 1047–48. 
 49. See id. (outlining criteria for psychoanalysts and research psychoanalysts). 
 50. Id. at 1048–49. 
 51. Id. at 1056. 
 52. Id. at 1050. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1051.  
 55. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the Lochnerization of the First 
Amendment). 
 56. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1051 (citing Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
 57. Id. at 1054. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Moreover, the medical services sector accounts in large part for the increase in licensing 
requirements. See Kleiner, supra note 26, at 7. 
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occupations, and pinning down the exact reason why licensing is likely 
indispensable for some, debatable for others, and perhaps unnecessary 
for the rest is a vexing issue. As one commentator notes:  
It is one thing to require a great deal of training and government certification for someone 
to work as a physician or attorney—occupations where the well-being of the public can 
reasonably be thought to be at stake. It is quite another for potential florists, African hair-
braiders, or casket-sellers—all of whom have sued over occupational restrictions, and 
none of whom present risks to public well-being—to face expensive, time-consuming and 
broadly unreasonable barriers to entry.60  
Whether this broad assertion of harmlessness is descriptively accurate 
is questionable.61 It is also important to note that outlier cases should 
not dictate the overall approach to licensing.62  
One key consideration is potential harm to clients resulting from 
bad advice. Thus, Richard Posner ties “the professional’s capacity to 
harm society” to the belief that entry into the profession “should be 
controlled by the government: that not only should the title of 
‘physician,’ ‘lawyer,’ etcetera be reserved for people who satisfy the 
profession’s own criteria for entry to the profession, but no one should 
be allowed to perform the services performed by the members of the 
profession without a license from the government.”63 Whatever the 
debates are at the margins, the theoretical point is most clearly 
conveyed with respect to these paradigmatic advice-giving professions 
where, from the client’s perspective, both the value of good advice and 
the potential harm caused by bad advice are especially great.  
 
 60. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 297–98. Even critics of licensing acknowledge such differences 
among professions. See, e.g., Kevin Dayranta, Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & John O’Shea, Reforming 
American Medical Licensure, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 241–42 (2019) (asserting that 
“occupational licensing regulations are not always necessary, and in most fields are far too onerous 
to be justified on informational asymmetry grounds” but acknowledging that “medicine is 
inherently different from most other fields”). But see Shirley V. Svorny, Beyond Medical Licensure: 
Is Licensing More Important for Doctors than for Interior Decorators or Hair Braiders?, HEALTH & 
MED., Spring 2015, at 26, 27, [hereinafter Svorny, Beyond Medical Licensure] 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2015/3/regulation-v38n1-6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TYQ7-99NP] (“There are people who seriously dispute the need for some form of 
professional regulation of health care providers . . . .”); Shirley Svorny, End State Licensing of 
Physicians, CATO INST. (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/end-state-
licensing-physicians [https://perma.cc/5BVZ-QNJJ] (arguing against physician licensing).  
 61. See, e.g., Monica C. Bell, The Braiding Cases, Cultural Deference, and the Inadequate 
Protection of Black Women Consumers, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 125, 140–43 (2007) (disputing 
the characterization of braiding as “harmless” and discussing potential harms). 
 62. See, e.g., Sandeep Vaheesan & Frank A. Pasquale, The Politics of Professionalism: 
Reappraising Occupational Licensure and Competition Policy, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 309, 
312 (“Commentators all too often extrapolate from horror stories to make claims about the entirety 
of licensing . . . .”). 
 63. Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998). 
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B. Standard Critiques 
Scholars and advocates have long criticized professional 
licensing for several reasons. Most prominent among these criticisms is 
the assertion that licensing improperly enshrines professionals’ 
economic interests. Moreover, licensing allegedly creates specious 
character and fitness requirements and insufficiently ensures 
competence. More recently, a new line of attack has emerged that raises 
the stakes considerably. First Amendment challenges to licensing are 
framed as “occupational freedom” cases explicitly based on economic 
considerations. By attempting to raise the level of scrutiny under which 
professional licensing is reviewed—from rational basis review of 
economic regulation to a higher level of scrutiny under the First 
Amendment64—these challenges cast licensing as constitutionally 
suspect.  
Whereas the previous critiques are best understood as primarily 
aimed at tailoring existing regimes to better fit the goals of licensing, 
the First Amendment critique introduces a constitutional dimension. 
After briefly surveying the previous critiques, it is the First 
Amendment–based deregulatory claim that this Article primarily 
contends with. 
1. Economic Interests 
Licensing limits access to the profession. It therefore arguably 
may be used in an anticompetitive manner to protect the economic 
interests of professionals against both potential outside competitors 
seeking entry into the profession and those within the group itself.65 
Contemporary economic criticism of professional licensing spans a wide 
political spectrum. The Obama administration called for a reduction of 
“unnecessary occupation licenses”;66 the Clinton campaign in 2016 
likewise embraced the reduction of licensing.67 The Hamilton Project at 
 
 64. See infra notes 128–132 and accompanying text. 
 65. Monaghan, supra note 25, at 164. 
 66. Press Release, Obama White House, Fact Sheet: New Steps to Reduce Unnecessary 
Occupation Licenses that are Limiting Worker Mobility and Reducing Wages (June 17, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/17/fact-sheet-new-steps-reduce-
unnecessary-occupation-licenses-are-limiting [https://perma.cc/2HBQ-LJGZ]; see also DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 45–46 (2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.
pdf [https://perma.cc/U29Z-2W5Q] (encouraging states to reduce the burdens of professional 
regulations). 
 67. Jeanne Sahadi, Hillary Clinton’s New Plan to Help Small Business Owners, CNN BUS. 
(Aug. 23, 2016, 2:17 PM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2016/08/23/news/economy/hillary-clinton-
small-business/index.html [https://perma.cc/KKC5-R8C2]. 
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the Brookings Institution released a report on licensing reform.68 
Libertarian groups have spearheaded current antilicensing litigation 
efforts.69 Official statements from the Trump administration do not 
seem to be readily available, but as then-governor of Indiana, Vice 
President Mike Pence vetoed a number of licensing requirements for 
professions, including diabetes counselors, anesthesiologist assistants, 
and dietitians.70 
Is licensing merely an access control mechanism that serves a 
profession’s economic interests by excluding newcomers? To pick just 
one example, critics have charged the legal profession with economic 
protectionism since the Great Depression, when it first began 
restricting the unauthorized practice of law. 71 The profession, however, 
has denied that protecting its economic interests motivated the 
restrictions placed on legal practice. 72 Complicating the picture, claims 
to expertise are intertwined with claims to authority that may be 
inseparable from economic interests.73 As Monaghan puts it, 
“ ‘Competency,’ then, may be but a euphemism for economic control of 
the trade group.”74 Historically, as critics of licensing readily 
acknowledge,75 concerns for health and public safety provided the basis 
for regulation.76 Tracing the origins of state medical boards, scholars 
note that “private medical associations pushed state legislators to adopt 
laws regulating the practice of medicine.”77 Physicians favored 
legislation protecting their market share from “irregulars” and 
“quacks.”78 Such laws advance economic interests, but whether they 
were the primary impetus or whether patient safety was the main 
concern remains contested among historians.79 Regardless of motive, 
the ensuing state regulation of medical practice was, “as a matter of 
 
 68. Kleiner, supra note 26; Ryan Nunn, The Future of Occupational Licensing Reform, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-future-of-
occupational-licensing-reform/ [https://perma.cc/D7WY-BL83].  
 69. See Occupational Licensing, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://ij.org/issues/economic-liberty/ 
occupational-licensing (last updated July 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/47UQ-2JYK] (“[O]ccupational 
licenses, which are essentially permission slips from the government, routinely stand in the way 
of honest enterprise.”). 
 70. See Kleiner, supra note 26, at 5. 
 71. Laurel A. Rigertas, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly: Failing to Protect Consumers, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2683, 2693 (2014). 
72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 25, at 167. 
 74. Id. at 165. 
 75. See, e.g., Kleiner, supra note 26, at 12. 
 76. Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline, 13 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 290 (2010). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
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law, clearly adopted pursuant to the legislative authority to protect 
public health and safety.”80 
Excavating some of the assumptions underlying the market in 
professional services helps assess whether licensing merely creates 
barriers to entry or whether it serves a public interest in ensuring 
competence—or both. Two familiar positions compete. On the one hand, 
critics of licensing contend that occupational licensing has 
overwhelmingly negative effects. It creates barriers to entry and 
restricts employment in licensed occupations, drives up prices, and 
limits economic opportunity.81 This results in reduced employment and 
increased prices and wages rather than better quality and safety.82 
Licensing under this view restricts upward mobility for lower-income 
individuals who seek occupational licensing83 and geographic mobility 
for higher-income individuals due to differing eligibility requirements 
across licensing jurisdictions for highly skilled occupations such as 
medical and legal professionals.84 Moreover, consumers may not benefit 
from licensing. Whereas prices have arguably risen and economic 
output declined, critics of licensing suggest that the quality of services 
may not have improved as a result of licensing.85  
On the other hand, scholars answer complaints that licensing 
raises prices without increasing the quality of services and blocks 
competitors from entering the market unless they fulfill certain 
training and testing requirements by pointing out that “each of these 
objections is not sufficiently theorized, justified, or empirically 
grounded” to support deregulatory interventions.86 Anecdotal “horror 
stories” of outlier cases (such as “falconers, ferret breeders, and palm 
readers,” “beekeepers and taxidermists,” and “cosmetologists and 
florists”87) provide an insufficient empirical basis.88 The argument 
articulated by critics of licensing also points to larger problems within 
antitrust doctrine which insufficiently accounts for “the societal value 
of occupational licensure or professional standards. Instead, it reflects 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Kleiner, supra note 26, at 6 (“[B]y making it more difficult to enter an occupation, 
licensing can affect employment in licensed occupations, wages of licensed works, the prices for 
their services, and worker economic opportunity more broadly.”). 
 82. Id.  
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. at 13; see also David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential 
Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 117–22 (2017) (discussing how “licensing requirements limit 
interstate mobility”). 
 85. Kleiner, supra note 26, at 6. 
 86. Vaheesan & Pasquale, supra note 62, at 3. 
 87. Id. at 3, 5. 
 88. Id. at 5. 
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mainstream economics’ bias against occupational licensure and a more 
general belief that government is the principal obstacle to competitive 
markets.”89  
Whether one subscribes to one or the other of the two models of 
the professional-services market has a significant impact on one’s view 
of professional licensing. It directly influences answers to fundamental 
and enduring questions, such as whether the professions are ordinary 
businesses. At a high enough level of abstraction, professionals’ 
economic activities may not fundamentally differ from other 
commercial endeavors. For example, as Bradley Wendel points out, 
“The legal profession has always been rhetorically committed to the 
distinction between a business and a profession.”90  
Thus, economic arguments for and against licensing exist. A 
system solely grounded in economic protectionism would certainly not 
justify a licensing regime91—but things are more complicated than that. 
Without resolving the conflict between different market models for 
professional services, the upshot is that economic considerations do not 
pose an insurmountable obstacle to imposing licensing requirements. 
However, different segments of the professional services market may be 
better regulated by more differentiated licensing regimes. 
2. Character and Fitness 
Deborah Rhode observes in her seminal article on the topic that 
“[m]oral character as a professional credential has an extended 
historical lineage.”92 Professional licensing is routinely tied to 
evaluations of the applicant’s moral character and fitness. For the legal 
profession, “the requirement dates to the Roman Theodesian Code, and 
its Anglo-American roots reach to thirteenth-century England.”93 In the 
medical context, the Supreme Court noted in the 1898 case Hawker v. 
New York that “[c]haracter is as important a qualification as 
 
 89. Id. at 2. 
 90. W. Bradley Wendel, The Profession’s Monopoly and Its Core Values, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2563, 2566 (2014); see also Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 VAND. L. 
REV. 741 (1988). 
 91. Cf. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1105 (2015) (“Limits on 
state-action immunity are most essential when a State seeks to delegate its regulatory power to 
active market participants, for dual allegiances are not always apparent to an actor 
and prohibitions against anticompetitive self-regulation by active market participants are an 
axiom of federal antitrust policy.”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) (“The fact 
that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield 
that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.”). 
 92. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 493 
(1985). 
 93. Id. 
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knowledge, and if the legislature may properly require a definite course 
of instruction, or a certain examination as to learning, it may with equal 
propriety prescribe what evidence of good character shall be 
furnished.”94  
In the United States, all state bars require “certification of 
character” as a condition for admission to practice law.95 The same is 
true in most other nations and for most other licensed professions.96 At 
the same time, moral character requirements evoke a bygone era in 
which they served as an attempt at establishing “distinctiveness” 
absent a claim to special expertise.97 And despite their long history, the 
requirements remain fuzzy and exceedingly difficult to objectively 
assess.98 Rhode explains:  
 
 94. 170 U.S. 189, 194 (1898) (upholding retroactive application of law prohibiting medical 
license for persons convicted of a crime against challenger after he had served a ten-year sentence 
for performing an abortion); see also Eastman v. State, 10 N.E. 97 (Ind. 1887) (affirming that the 
state may require good moral character for licensing); Thompson v. Hazen, 25 Me. 104 (1845); 
State ex rel. Powell v. State Med. Examining Bd., 20 N.W. 238 (Minn. 1884) (same); State v. 
Hathaway, 21 S.W. 1081 (Mo. 1893) (same); State v. Call, 28 S.E. 517 (N.C. 1897) (same).  
 95. Rhode, supra note 92, at 493. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., Broman, supra note 23, at 842 (“In a situation where physicians were not 
manifestly more ‘expert’ as practitioners, their rhetoric tended to emphasize social distinctiveness 
in other ways.”). Accordingly, the advice given to young physicians reflected this distinctiveness 
claim in the following way:  
Even at the very end of the century, physicians routinely depicted themselves as 
members of a gentlemanly caste distinguished by its learning and dignified reserve. 
One well-received guide for aspiring physicians, written by the Tübingen medical 
professor Wilhelm Gottfried Ploucquet (1744–1814), emphasized the good moral 
character and bearing required of a physician. To develop these traits, Ploucquet 
suggested that young men intended for the medical profession be given training in 
dancing (which would teach them to move gracefully), music, drawing, and painting. 
For those who had finished their education and entered upon professional life, 
Ploucquet sternly enjoined them from being seen in public drinking houses or playing 
games of chance. In outfitting their offices, he advised young doctors to display their 
testimonials and degrees prominently and to assemble an impressive library, the 
contents of which should presumably be read, although Ploucquet did not elaborate on 
that point. They should also guard against changing churches without good cause, as 
well as creating any suspicion of either irreligiosity or zealotry. Finally, Ploucquet 
recommended that the young doctor dress well but not too elegantly, that he cultivate 
a pleasant and witty manner, and that he not contradict his superiors, except of course 
in medical matters. 
Id. at 844. 
 98. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 92, at 529–46 (discussing subjectivity of standards and 
idiosyncrasies of implementation); id. at 559–63 (discussing problems with predictions based on 
prior conduct); see also, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, The Folly of Expecting Evil: Reconsidering the Bar’s 
Character and Fitness Requirement, 2014 BYU L. REV. 775, 777 (2014) (discussing the many 
shortcomings of the character and fitness inquiry); Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth and Other 
Tales About the Superiority of Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2622 (2014) [hereinafter Levin, 
Monopoly Myth] (“[T]he information elicited during that process (e.g., prior convictions, substance 
abuse) does not strongly predict who will later be disciplined.”). 
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In the absence of meaningful standards or professional consensus, the filtering process 
has proved inconsistent, idiosyncratic, and needlessly intrusive. We have developed 
neither a coherent concept of professional character nor effective procedures to predict it. 
Rather, we have maintained a licensing ritual that too often has debased the ideals it 
seeks to sustain.99  
On the one hand, few applicants are actually denied admission.100 
Historically, as Rhode points out, “[t]he only substantial group 
effectively excluded on grounds of character seems to have been 
women.”101 On the other hand, “the number deterred, delayed or 
harassed has been more substantial.”102  
But the individual professional can be tied to the ethics of the 
profession without an individualized character test as a precondition 
for entry. Subsequent enforcement of ethics codes by disciplinary bodies 
more plausibly accomplishes this goal. Implementation of subsequent 
enforcement, however, is not without potential pitfalls. In the 
healthcare context, Nadia Sawicki has argued that state medical 
licensing boards ought to prioritize disciplinary action taken on the 
basis of competence rather than character.103 Medical boards “often 
focus on character-related misconduct, including criminal misconduct, 
that bears only a tangential relation to clinical quality and patient 
care.”104 Citing disciplinary actions for behaviors “as varied as tax 
fraud, failure to facilitate review of child support obligations, soliciting 
sex in a public restroom, possession of marijuana for personal use, and 
reckless driving involving alcohol,” Sawicki “questions whether, in light 
of the traditional goals of professional discipline, sanctioning physicians 
on these grounds (as opposed to grounds more clearly linked to clinical 
practice) is the most effective or efficient use of medical boards’ 
resources.”105  
Rhode reaches the same conclusion with respect to the legal 
profession. Abandoning the character inquiry as a prerequisite for 
admissions and ending the policing of nonprofessional behavior would 
 
 99. Rhode, supra note 92, at 494. 
 100. Id. at 493–94. For a prominent example, see In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 83 (1961). See 
also Crimesider Staff, From Jail to Yale: Man Faces Scrutiny in Bid to Be Lawyer, CBS NEWS (Aug. 
8, 2017, 3:36 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/from-jail-to-yale-man-faces-scrutiny-in-bid-to-
become-lawyer/ [http://perma.cc/349D-ZXVR] (“A convicted felon who graduated from Yale Law 
School and won acclaim as a poet is being asked by a Connecticut committee to prove his ‘good 
moral character’ before he is allowed to practice law.”); Bari Weiss, Opinion, Admit This Ex-Con 
to the Connecticut Bar, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2vkjlTF [https://perma.cc/DRY8-
3RPN] (“Dwayne Betts is the kind of man who should be receiving awards from the bar association 
of Connecticut. Instead, he hasn’t been admitted.”). 
 101. Rhode, supra note 92, at 497. 
 102. Id. at 494. 
 103. Sawicki, supra note 76. 
 104. Id. at 287. 
 105. Id. at 288. 
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allow a new focus on professional abuses.106 She notes that “if the 
profession’s regulatory process is to assume meaningful symbolic 
dimensions, its force should be conserved for acts bearing directly on 
professional practice.”107 Further, “[m]ost garden variety professional 
misconduct—incompetence, harassment, deception, and delay—is 
rarely reported or sanctioned. Until those priorities are reversed, the 
bar can lay no special claim to character as a professional credential.”108 
Understanding the professions as knowledge communities adds force to 
this argument.109 A knowledge-centered approach highlights the ill fit 
between character requirements upon entry and nonprofessional 
discipline, while also emphasizing the need for more oversight of 
professional behavior and, in particular, an emphasis on ensuring 
competence. 
Ultimately, absent empirical support for the claim that the 
character and fitness inquiry actually ensures professionals’ superior 
moral character for the benefit of clients, ascertaining the character and 
fitness of professionals as a prerequisite for entry into the profession is 
a weak justification for professional licensing. It seems particularly 
outdated to the modern view of professionalism, which, at its core, 
means professional competence. Whereas ex post enforcement of 
professional responsibility and ethics rules on professional activities by 
way of disciplinary action can plausibly ensure that the licensed 
member of the profession acts in accordance with the profession’s rules, 
 
 106. Rhode, supra note 92, at 585; id. at 589 (“[A]bandoning the enterprise has much to 
commend it. In essence, the bar would cease monitoring character for purposes of admitting 
attorneys or of disciplining non-professional abuses. Such an approach would avoid the 
indeterminacies of standards, the rigidity of rules, and the pretense that either promises adequate 
public protection.”). 
 107. Id. at 591. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 509: 
[T]he bar’s own interest in maintaining a professional community and public image. In 
both its instrumental and symbolic dimensions, the certification process provides an 
opportunity for affirming shared values. As sociologists since Durkheim have argued, 
the concept of a profession presupposes some sense of common identity. Excluding 
certain candidates on character grounds serves to designate deviance, thus establishing 
the boundaries of a moral community.  
 Whereas Rhode’s focus is on the profession as a moral community, I emphasize the profession’s 
shared knowledge. This approach likewise demands the exclusion of outliers, but not on moral 
grounds. Exclusion of outliers under the knowledge community approach excludes those who do 
not base their professional advice on a shared methodology and justify their professional advice in 
terms of shared ways of knowing and reasoning of the profession. See Claudia E. Haupt, Religious 
Outliers: Professional Knowledge Communities, Individual Conscience Claims, and the 
Availability of Professional Services to the Public, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED 
STATES 173 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017); Haupt, supra note 10, at 690–705 
(discussing justifications for outlier status).  
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ex ante assessments of the applicant’s moral character and fitness do 
not provide a useful justification for professional licensing.  
3. Competence 
Perhaps most importantly, licensing requirements are intended 
to ensure professionals’ competence. Competence is at the core of the 
harm-avoidance principle that underlies traditional justifications of 
licensing. Only a competent professional will give good advice, and 
licensing should help ensure that unqualified providers do not harm 
clients and patients by giving bad advice. With respect to the legal 
profession, Wendel thus has “no doubt that regulation can be justified 
as a means of ensuring the quality of some product or service,” including 
the provision of legal services.110 Graduating from law school and 
passing the bar exam can be required as a matter of professional 
regulation because these benchmarks signal to prospective clients the 
requisite competence of the person providing legal services.111 But other 
scholars cite empirical evidence suggesting “that experienced 
nonlawyers can provide competent legal services in certain contexts and 
in some cases, can seemingly do so as effectively as lawyers.”112 Stated 
another way, just being licensed does not guarantee expertise; it may 
be necessary, but not sufficient for rendering competent advice.113 
However, the professional-practice context matters. Lawyer 
representation in civil proceedings, for example, is deemed superior to 
nonlawyer representation in the same arena.114 Another way to put the 
question is whether “formal legal training” matters and when outcomes 
are most likely to be affected.115 Studying a variety of settings, including 
unemployment compensation appeals, social security disability 
appeals, state labor grievance arbitration, and tax appeals, one 
prominent scholar “concluded that the ‘presence or absence of formal 
legal training is less important than substantial experience with the 
 
 110. Wendel, supra note 90, at 2579.  
 111. Id. But see Rigertas, supra note 71, at 2683 (“[R]estricting the practice of law to those who 
have completed a juris doctor has constrained the market options so that many consumers have 
no access to legal services at all.”). 
 112. Levin, Monopoly Myth, supra note 98, at 2614. 
 113. See Wendel, supra note 90, at 2580–81 (suggesting that “it may be the case that 
professional expertise is highly differentiated. Merely being admitted to practice law does not 
guarantee one’s competence at any particular task, let alone one’s comparative advantage over 
nonlawyer professionals at performing that task”). 
 114. Levin, Monopoly Myth, supra note 98, at 2617–18 (further noting that “the procedural 
complexity of the matters may affect the degree of differences in outcomes when individuals are 
represented by lawyers and when they are not”). 
 115. Id. at 2619–20 (citing HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND 
NONLAWYERS AT WORK (1998)). 
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setting.’ Three types of expertise were important: knowledge about the 
substantive law, an understanding of the procedures, and familiarity 
with the regular players in the process.”116 
None of this cuts against professional licensing in general. 
Rather, these insights suggest alternative licensing regimes. They do 
not, however, support the notion that clients are better off being 
represented by unlicensed providers. In fact, citing the example of 
unlicensed “notarios,” Leslie Levin notes that their lack of training in 
the complex area of immigration law and their inadequate advice “can 
have devastating consequences.”117 Moreover, certain particularly 
complex matters are best handled by experienced individuals.118 
Likewise, the case for restricting legal practice to trained and licensed 
attorneys is strongest in the litigation setting.119 In other words, 
expertise is important, and licensing—subject to appropriate 
calibrating—is a useful mechanism in principle to achieve the 
important goal of protecting the public by way of ensuring quality in 
professional services. 
The upshot of this line of criticism primarily concerns tailoring. 
One solution might involve licensed nonlawyer providers.120 But that is 
very different from opposition to licensing, as these scholars readily 
point out.121 Similarly, Levin notes that “the public would be better 
served if more nonlawyer representatives—who were subject to 
educational and licensing requirements—could provide more legal 
services to the public.”122 The critics of unauthorized practice laws thus 
do not, in fact, challenge in any fundamental way the wisdom of 
 
 116. Id. at 2620. 
 117. Id. at 2616. 
 118. Id. at 2629 (“No one seriously questions that an experienced securities litigator is more 
competent to handle a federal securities lawsuit than an untrained lay representative.”). 
 119. Rigertas, supra note 71, at 2699. However, Rigertas notes that “[t]he relative strength of 
the justification does not necessarily mean that only lawyers should perform those services.” Id. 
 120. Rhode & Ricca, supra note 37, at 2607. 
 121. Id. (“[O]pening the practice to ‘unschooled unregulated nonlawyers’ is not the only 
alternative to lawyers’ monopoly over routine assistance. We advocate access to qualified licensed 
providers.”). But see Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 96 (1981) 
(expressing preference for “voluntary certification or mandatory registration”). Rhode further 
notes that “as a policy matter, full-scale licensing structures are desirable only when harms are 
‘demonstrated or easily recognizable.’ As a constitutional matter, however, such restraints are still 
a less restrictive and hence preferable alternative to unqualified prohibitions on lay practice.” Id. 
(footnote omitted).  
 122. Levin, Monopoly Myth, supra note 98, at 2615; see also Rigertas, supra note 71, at 2689 
(suggesting that “regulating the delivery of legal services does not necessarily mean that only 
lawyers can deliver legal services” because “[d]ifferent types of practitioners could be regulated 
too”). 
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licensing. Rather, they advocate a different way of tailoring licensing 
regimes and the services provided by other licensed professionals.  
Such ideas of diversifying and recalibrating professional 
licensing are proliferating in various forms and across various 
professions. One example is the licensing of Limited License Legal 
Technicians (“LLLTs”) in the state of Washington, the first state to 
introduce this legal service provider model.123 In 2019, Utah will become 
the second state to do so.124 Importantly, licensing is still tied to 
competence. As compared to legal service providers, the healthcare 
professions display a wider variety of licensed professions performing 
some tasks previously allocated primarily to physicians.125 The 
emergence of physician assistants in the twentieth century serves as an 
example of this phenomenon.126  
In the end, the critics make a forceful argument for recalibrating 
existing regimes to better match licensing to competence and access. 
But they do not argue that weeding out bad providers ought to be left 
solely to ex post regulation by the tort regime, nor do they argue that 
professional licensing should be abandoned entirely.  
C. The New First Amendment Critique 
First Amendment attacks on professional licensing are newly 
popular.127 Indeed, “plaintiffs across the country are increasingly 
invoking the Free Speech Clause as a shield against what a generation 
ago would have been viewed as ordinary economic regulation subject to 
 
 123. Become A Legal Technician, WASH. ST. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 13, 2018), http://www.wsba.org/ 
licensing-and-lawyer-conduct/limited-licenses/legal-technicians [https://perma.cc/7K8U-S53M]; 
see also Levin, Monopoly Myth, supra note 98, at 2630–31 (explaining the scope of LLLTs’ 
professional activities and education and other licensing requirements); Rigertas, supra note 71, 
at 2699 (“Three states—Washington, California, and New York—are all currently examining the 
role that nonlawyers can play in the delivery of legal services. This suggests some growing 
recognition that a licensed attorney may not be needed for every legal issue.”). Other examples 
include certified legal document preparers in Arizona and legal document assistants in California. 
See Levin, Monopoly Myth, supra note 98, at 2615. 
 124. Debra Cassens Weiss, First Paralegal Practitioners in Utah are Expected to be Licensed 
in 2019, ABA J. (Aug 7, 2018, 9:04 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/first_ 
paralegal_practitioners_in_utah_are_expected_to_be_licensed_in_2019 [https://perma.cc/X5E3-
J3EJ].  
 125. Cf. Rigertas, supra note 71, at 2699 (“Much like the delivery of healthcare services, there 
are potential benefits in stratifying the legal profession to train and regulate professionals with 
different types of legal training.”(footnote omitted)).  
 126. See, e.g., Reginald Carter, Physician Assistant History, 12 PERSPECTIVE ON PHYSICIAN 
ASSISTANT EDUC. 130 (2001) (providing a brief overview of the profession). 
 127. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Many of these current and recent cases are 
litigated by the Institute for Justice, which makes a list of them available on its website. See Cases, 
INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://ij.org/cases (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/RP2Y-U4BM] 
(listing economic liberty and First Amendment cases).  
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lax, if any, constitutional review.”128 One lawyer explains that “several 
trends in constitutional scholarship and doctrine suggest that a 
transformation of [occupational freedom] jurisprudence may be closer 
at hand than many would suppose.”129 One of the indicators of change 
he cites is “[a] growing number of cases where the fundamental right to 
free speech meets the nonfundamental right to occupational 
freedom.”130 The explicit goal is to unsettle the rational basis framework 
commonly applied to professional regulation131 and substitute the 
doctrinal framework of the First Amendment.132 Framing licensing 
challenges as First Amendment claims, in other words, is an attempt to 
heighten the level of scrutiny that would otherwise apply to economic 
regulation. 
First Amendment challenges to licensing can take several forms. 
One approach contends that professional licensing imposes a prior 
restraint on speech. The Ninth Circuit in National Ass’n for the 
Advancement of Psychoanalysis held “that the psychology licensing 
laws are not a prior restraint on speech.”133 The court explained in two 
short sentences: “Because this is a valid licensing scheme designed to 
protect the mental health of Californians, the state ‘may exercise some 
discretion in granting licenses.’ Because there is no allegation that the 
state is revoking or denying licenses ‘for arbitrary or constitutionally 
suspect reasons,’ there is no problem of prior restraint.”134  
Conversely, Robert Kry has argued that professional licensing 
does, in fact, raise First Amendment concerns precisely “because the 
license requirement arguably acts as a prior restraint on speech.”135 
Professional licensing regimes, he suggests, are especially troublesome 
as a form of prior restraint because they “impose significant burdens on 
the speaker” and “grant administrative officials broad discretion in 
evaluating applications.”136 I will later return to the question of prior 
restraint.137 To preview my conclusion, professional licensing is indeed 
a prior restraint on a professional’s speech, but in the professional 
 
 128. Shanor, supra note 11, at 316.  
 129. Neily, supra note 1, at 305. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (“[I]t is for the 
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement.”).  
 132. Neily, supra note 1, at 311 (“Applying the various forms of heightened scrutiny typically 
associated with free speech claims to cases involving occupational speech creates interesting and 
potentially fruitful doctrinal tensions.”). 
 133. 228 F.3d 1043, 1056 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 134. Id. (citation omitted).  
 135. Kry, supra note 7, at 889. 
 136. Id. at 890. 
 137. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
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context, it is permissible for the reasons set forth in the intervening 
analysis.138 
The tour guide cases—challenging various cities’ requirements 
that tour guides be licensed—provide examples of additional First 
Amendment claims.139 Plaintiffs relied on the First Amendment to 
argue that the licensing schemes were impermissible content-based 
regulations of speech.140 In addition, they argued that even if the 
regulations were content neutral, there was no evidence of harm that 
supported creating licensing requirements for tour guides.141 
The Fifth Circuit in the New Orleans tour guide case explained 
that applicants for a license “must pass an examination testing 
knowledge of the historical, cultural and sociological developments and 
points of interest of the city, must not have been convicted of a felony 
within the prior five years, pass a drug test, and pay a . . . fee.”142 The 
court reasoned that the city had an interest in benefitting its visitors by 
identifying tour guides with licenses as being 
“reliable, . . . knowledgeable about the city and trustworthy, law-
abiding and free of drug addiction.”143 The court held this to be a valid 
exercise of police powers that did not target the content of speech.144 
Thus, “New Orleans, by requiring the licensees to know the city and not 
be felons or drug addicts, has effectively promoted the government 
interests, and without those protections for the city and its visitors, the 
government interest would be unserved.”145 
Conversely, the D.C. Circuit found “the record wholly devoid of 
evidence supporting the burdens the challenged regulations impose 
on . . . speech.”146 Assuming that the regulations were content 
neutral,147 the court nonetheless still held them to fail intermediate 
scrutiny and pointed out “the substantial mismatch” between the 
regulation and its goals.148 Requiring tour guides to take an exam, in 
 
 138. See infra Parts II & III. 
 139. See Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that 
even if a D.C. tour guide licensing regime was content neutral, it failed intermediate scrutiny); 
Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that a tour guide licensing 
law was content neutral); Billups v. City of Charleston, 194 F. Supp. 3d 452, 475 (D.S.C. 2016) 
(involving a First Amendment challenge to the city’s tour guide licensing law). 
 140. Edwards, 755 F.3d at 1000. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Kagan, 753 F.3d at 561 (noting that the fee for the initial application is fifty dollars and 
the renewal fee is twenty dollars “when renewing after two years”). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 561–62. 
 145. Id. at 562. 
 146. Edwards, 755 F.3d at 998. 
 147. Id. at 1001. 
 148. Id. at 1008. 
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the court’s view, was not “an appropriately tailored antidote,” even if 
the District’s goal was to prevent potential harms to visitors.149 
Finally, in the Charleston tour guide case, the district court 
initially denied a preliminary injunction against the licensing 
regulations.150 The court followed a similar line of reasoning as the Fifth 
Circuit in determining the regulation to be content neutral.151 Applying 
intermediate scrutiny, the district court determined that the D.C. 
Circuit’s approach “provide[d] a somewhat better illustration of the 
analysis required.”152 Although in the district court’s view the demands 
for showing evidence of harm were less stringent than the D.C. Circuit 
articulated, it held that Charleston was required to provide some 
evidence of harms that the licensing requirement prevents.153 After a 
bench trial, the court decided that the licensing regime was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.154  
The Charleston tour guide case was decided after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,155 a case involving a 
municipal sign ordinance. Taken literally, the Reed decision imposed a 
strict and sweeping requirement of content neutrality.156 Indeed, the 
district court framed its First Amendment analysis in terms of Reed’s 
requirement of content neutrality,157 initially rejecting158 but ultimately 
leaving open its application in the Charleston case.159 By contrast, the 
Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, a case 
concerning a Florida statute that prohibited doctors from asking about 
gun ownership as a matter of course, applied the content-neutrality 
framework of Reed to professional speech regulation.160 Whether the 
requirement of content neutrality applies in the area of professional 
licensing or professional speech regulation is an unresolved question of 
 
 149. Id. at 1009. 
 150. Billups v. City of Charleston, 194 F. Supp. 3d 452, 467 (D.S.C. 2016). 
 151. Id. at 466–67.  
 152. Id. at 472. 
 153. Id. at 472–73. 
 154. Id. at 517–18.  
 155. 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2233 (2015). 
 156. See Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1981, 
1986 (2016). 
 157. Billups, 194 F. Supp. 3d at 461–65. 
 158. Id. at 464 (noting that the Reed Court “cannot have meant that every law restricting 
conduct also imposes a content-based restriction on speech made in the course of such conduct” 
because it “would effectively remove the distinction between speech and conduct, and require 
almost every regulation to pass strict scrutiny under the First Amendment,” an “untenable” 
result). 
 159. Id. at 511 (“The court does not need to determine whether the licensing law is content-
based . . . .”). 
 160. 848 F.3d 1293, 1302–03, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2017). 
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First Amendment doctrine. The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in 
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates (“NIFLA”) v. Becerra 
suggests that it does,161 while the dissent cautions against an overly 
broad understanding of the doctrine of content neutrality.162 I have 
argued elsewhere that content neutrality should be rejected in this 
context.163  
In addition to tour guides,164 First Amendment challenges target 
licensing requirements for such diverse occupations as fortune tellers165 
and interior decorators.166 Notably, these cases are frequently discussed 
alongside cases involving professionals such as psychologists, doctors, 
and lawyers.167 But doing so obscures an important point: not all 
professional licensing schemes are the same. For one, “not all 
occupations pose equivalent threats to health and safety.”168 Amanda 
Shanor, in illustrating the critics’ argument, raises a useful example 
that clarifies how the concept of the professions as knowledge 
communities influences the analysis:  
If I am your doctor, and I recommend we amputate your leg (when, based on prevailing 
professional norms, we certainly should not), and you later sue me for malpractice, the 
claim is no less based on words than a tour guide who “speaks” for a living. “But,” you 
might say, “the malpractice example has a real-world harm—you cut off my leg!” Of 
course, you would be right. But that harm does not have any analytically different 
relationship to speech than the sorts of harms – health and safety, say – that licensing 
 
 161. See 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018) (“The dangers associated with content-based regulations 
of speech are also present in the context of professional speech.”).  
 162. Id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting): 
Because much, perhaps most, human behavior takes place through speech and because 
much, perhaps most, law regulates that speech in terms of its content, the majority’s 
approach at the least threatens considerable litigation over the constitutional validity 
of much, perhaps most, government regulation. 
 163. See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality Trap, 127 YALE 
L.J. FORUM 150, 151 (2017) (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s content-neutrality approach in 
Wollschlaeger); see also infra Section IV.A.1. 
 164. See supra notes 139–153 and accompanying text. 
 165. See Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 562–65 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 166. See Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 167. See, e.g., NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375 (“As defined by the courts of appeals, the professional-
speech doctrine would cover a wide array of individuals—doctors, lawyers, nurses, physical 
therapists, truck drivers, bartenders, barbers, and many others.”); see also Neily, supra note 1, at 
310 (citing cases involving psychologists: Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 2014); 
and King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 246 (3d Cir. 2014)); Shanor, supra note 11, at 
315 (noting that previously, “[r]egulations requiring you to get a license before working as a doctor, 
a lawyer, or a candlestick maker (not to mention a tour guide or a securities trader), were . . . part 
of the vast swath of non-constitutionalized economic life”); Kleiner, supra note 26, at 12–14 
(discussing healthcare professions alongside TV repair servicers, construction contractors, florists, 
and teachers). 
 168. Kleiner, supra note 26, at 5.  
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seeks to address in the first instance. The harms that may flow from fraud or malpractice 
are no less related to the “speakingness” of a “speaking occupation.”169 
But understanding professional advice and its relationship to a 
knowledge community leads to an analytical distinction between the 
speech of a doctor—rightly subject to malpractice liability170—and the 
speech of a tour guide. Under a professional speech theory based on an 
understanding of the professions as knowledge communities, speech 
that does not convey professional knowledge is not protected as 
professional speech. The analytical shift I propose is from the speech 
itself as the form of communication to the specific kind of speech—that 
is, professional speech communicating the knowledge community’s 
insights to the client within a professional-client relationship. If a 
professional’s speech merely conveys information—the content of the 
tour guide’s speech could just as well be gleaned from Google Maps or a 
guidebook—it is not personalized advice that communicates the 
knowledge community’s insights. And licensing is still permissible for 
reasons unrelated to speech. Imagine a guided Segway tour; a licensing 
requirement might ensure that the Segway does not cause injuries. 
Professional speech is a distinctive type of speech that is more 
than the conveyance of raw information. Its content is instead 
individualized to the situation of the client,171 it is tied to a body of 
disciplinary knowledge from which it gains authority, and it occurs 
within a social relationship that is defined by knowledge asymmetry 
between speaker and listener, reliance on the speaker’s advice, and 
trust in the accuracy of that advice.172  
The key to a conceptual solution for the First Amendment-
versus-licensing puzzle lies in understanding the underlying normative 
concerns. If we reconceptualize professionals as members of knowledge 
communities, First Amendment interests in the professional context 
reinforce—rather than undermine—the goals of licensing. The shared 
interest is to ensure that competent advice flows from the knowledge 
community through the conduit of the individual professional to the 
client. To support this claim, Part II provides a thicker account of the 
nature of, and interests involved in, professional advice-giving. 
 
 169. Shanor, supra note 11, at 321. 
 170. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1285–87 (discussing professional malpractice liability). 
 171. Cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result) (“One who 
takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the 
client in the light of the client’s individual needs and circumstances is properly viewed as engaging 
in the practice of a profession.”). 
 172. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1250–54. 
Haupt_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/31/2019 1:27 AM 
530 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2:501 
D. Identifying the Object of Licensing 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the subjects of 
licensing—ranging from tour guides, psychics, and interior decorators 
to doctors, lawyers, therapists, and pharmacists. But a more useful 
question concerns the object of licensing, and I suggest that shifting 
focus to the object brings the central role of professional knowledge to 
the fore. This different perspective also reflects a move in the sociology 
of the professions literature away from the question of “what is a 
profession?”173 The object of licensing across professions may be 
different, accounting for conceptual slippage. In other words, knowledge 
is not always the object of licensing in the professions discussed. One 
key question is whether professional advice-giving or the delivery of a 
service is the primary objective of the professional-client relationship. 
Another question is whether information—as in the tour guide cases—
or professional knowledge is conveyed. 
The most salient justification for professional licensing is 
ensuring the professional’s competence; thus, the object of licensing is 
the professional’s knowledge. Licensing so understood ties the 
individual professional to the knowledge community by requiring a link 
between the ability to speak as a professional and the communication 
of knowledge as defined by the profession. This concept necessarily 
excludes a number of occupations. Where a professional’s activity does 
not consist of advice-giving, the link between advice and the knowledge 
community does not exist. Of course, this conceptualization results in 
line-drawing exercises that are difficult to exhaustively resolve in the 
abstract. But the existence of a fiduciary relationship or of a regime of 
professional malpractice liability can serve as a useful proxy. 
As discussed in the tour guide examples, where information but 
not professional knowledge is communicated, the value of the 
professional’s speech is more like the delivery of a service. This accounts 
for the difference in the speech of the psychic or the tour guide on the 
one hand and the doctor or lawyer on the other hand.174 It also points 
to the limits of licensing to protect professional advice. The framework 
applies to professions where the object of licensing is the content of a 
 
 173. See infra Section II.B. 
 174. Cf. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 
(2018): 
‘Professional speech’ is also a difficult category to define with precision. As defined by 
the courts of appeals, the professional-speech doctrine would cover a wide array of 
individuals—doctors, lawyers, nurses, physical therapists, truck drivers, bartenders, 
barbers, and many others. One court of appeals has even applied it to fortune tellers.  
(citations omitted).  
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professional knowledge community’s insights.175 This is not to collapse 
the speech/conduct distinction but rather to distinguish professional 
speech that communicates a knowledge community’s expertise. 
An important consequence of shifting the focus to professional 
knowledge is that the First Amendment critique of professional 
licensing fails when the object of licensing is professional knowledge. 
The values underlying First Amendment protection of professional 
speech and ensuring the competence of professionals, the objective of 
professional licensing, rather than being in conflict, are mutually 
reinforcing. The remainder of this Article provides a defense of this 
claim, and offers a new view of justifications for professional licensing 
that builds on this understanding.  
II. EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND PROFESSIONAL ADVICE 
 Fully appreciating the values underlying professional speech 
and professional licensing requires a thicker account of what 
professional knowledge is, how it is generated, and what its effects are. 
This Part offers a descriptive-analytical account of the nature of expert 
knowledge, its connection to professional advice-giving, and its societal 
effects by drawing on the sociology of knowledge and science and 
technology studies (“STS”) literature regarding the epistemological 
foundations of expert knowledge. It then puts this body of literature 
into conversation with scholarship on the sociology of the professions. 
In so doing, it seeks to respond in part to Robert Post’s call for 
developing a “constitutional sociology of knowledge.”176 This account 
reveals the distinctive nature of professional advice-giving and its link 
to the professional knowledge community’s body of knowledge. It also 
explains why First Amendment doctrine should reflect the unique 
nature of professional speech. 
The following discussion first distinguishes information and 
knowledge—a specific type of information communicated as 
professional advice. It then connects expert-knowledge formation to the 
dissemination of professional advice. Finally, through the lens of 
democratic theory, it traces the flow of professional expert knowledge 
from the knowledge community through the individual professional 
within the professional-client relationship to the client and back into 
public discourse. 
 
 175. Cf. id. at 2382–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining how the majority’s constitutional 
approach to content-based speech will obscure First Amendment goals).  
 176. POST, supra note 14, at 55. 
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A. Distinguishing Information and Knowledge 
The hook for First Amendment challenges to professional 
licensing is that many professionals convey advice through language.177 
As one commentator notes, “In the information age, an increasing 
number of vocations involve nothing more than expressing ideas or 
transmitting information, rather than creating a physical product.”178 
Another critic of licensing asserts that while the Supreme Court has 
loosened commercial speech restrictions in the interest of “the free flow 
of information to the consumer,” it has yet “to fully realize the 
importance of the free flow of information to the recipient of 
professional advice.”179  
But conflating information and knowledge rests on an 
oversimplification. The listener’s perspective reveals the qualitative 
difference between them. A client or patient today may have access to 
virtually unlimited amounts of information through multiple channels. 
Yet, none of this information amounts to expert knowledge. To be flip, 
Dr. Google is not really your doctor. 
Licensing regimes, like fiduciary duties, assume asymmetry 
between actors: “The professional-client relationship is typically 
characterized by an asymmetry of knowledge. The client seeks the 
professional’s advice precisely because of this asymmetry.”180 But some 
question the accuracy of that assumption in an era of ever-increasing 
access to information.181 Discussing various forms of policy responses to 
information asymmetries, they contend that “[a]s information becomes 
more prevalent and systematic, earlier solutions to asymmetric 
problems will become less necessary.”182 Scholars of the legal profession 
likewise assert that “[t]he internet has provided consumers with 
increasing access to information about the law and to information about 
the quality of services provided.”183 But do considerations underlying 
information asymmetries184 translate to licensing healthcare providers? 
Some critics of licensing say yes, noting that “[f]or decades, asymmetric 
 
 177. See supra notes 165–167 and accompanying text. 
 178. Neily, supra note 1, at 310. 
 179. Kry, supra note 7, at 976. 
 180. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1243.  
 181. See, e.g., Alex Tabarrok & Tyler Cowen, The End of Asymmetric Information, CATO 
UNBOUND (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/04/06/alex-tabarrok-tyler-cowen/ 
end-asymmetric-information [https://perma.cc/VM5G-LUX9] (“A lot of economic theories about 
asymmetric information, while logically correct, have been rendered empirically obsolete.”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Rigertas, supra note 71, at 2691. 
 184. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (examining how information asymmetry affects markets). 
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information—the inability of consumers to judge medical 
professionals—has been the go-to defense for state-level licensing 
activities.”185 Largely reciting the economic critiques of professional 
licensing,186 these critics argue that “the asymmetric information 
argument has been used far too often to protect rents, including the 
protection of physicians and dentists from greater competition from 
nurse practitioners and dental hygienists.”187 As already noted in the 
discussion of economic objections to licensing, these arguments 
primarily cut in favor of recalibrating, rather than abolishing, existing 
licensing regimes.  
The larger question concerns the nature and formation of expert 
knowledge. Is expert knowledge still relevant in the information age? 
This requires a closer look at who is an expert to begin with, a 
foundational question in the sociology of knowledge literature. Who 
counts as an expert, and how far does the group of experts, however 
defined, extend into the public? Medical sociology, for instance, has 
observed a trend toward democratization as a result of a wider 
“challenge on the expertise of professionals.”188 Discussions 
surrounding the term “lay expert” reflect the underlying concerns. 
Some scholars suggest that the lay public can, in fact, acquire relevant 
knowledge through various channels, including “having experiential 
knowledge of a condition” or otherwise acquiring knowledge “on a par 
with those who have scientific training.”189 Others, however, discard 
this term as an oxymoron, instead suggesting that the real question 
concerns the “extension” of whose knowledge counts as expertise, not 
how individuals acquired their expertise.190 Nonetheless, even those 
 
 185. Shirley V. Svorny, Asymmetric Information and Medical Licensure, CATO UNBOUND (Apr. 
10, 2015), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/04/10/shirley-v-svorny/asymmetric-information-
medical-licensure [https://perma.cc/7MSW-LU4T].  
 186. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 187. Alex Tabarrok & Tyler Cowen, Symmetric Information Won’t Be Perfect, CATO UNBOUND 
(Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/04/20/alex-tabarrok-tyler-cowen/symmetric-
information-wont-be-perfect [https://perma.cc/Z63E-8RAJ]. 
 188. Lindsay Prior, Belief, Knowledge and Expertise: The Emergence of the Lay Expert in 
Medical Sociology, 25 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 41, 43 (2003). 
 189. Id. at 45 (citing literature on AIDS); see also H.M. Collins & Robert Evans, The Third 
Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience, 32 SOC. STUD. SCI. 235, 262 (2002) 
(“The AIDS-treatment controversy in the San Francisco gay community is an example where the 
non-certified experts succeeded in gaining an entrée to the scientific core. But they did not manage 
this until they gained interactional expertise – that is, until after they learned the language of the 
relevant science.” (footnote omitted)). The foundational sociological study is STEVEN EPSTEIN, 
IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (1996). 
 190. Collins & Evans, supra note 189, at 238: 
We say that those referred to by some other analysts as ‘lay experts’ are just plain 
‘experts’ – albeit their expertise has not been recognized by certification; crucially, they 
are not spread throughout the population, but are found in small specialist groups. 
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employing the term note that “for the most part, lay people are not 
experts. They are, for example, rarely skilled in matters of (medical) 
fact gathering, or in the business of diagnosis. What is more they can 
often be plain wrong about the causes, course and management of 
common forms of disease and illness.”191  
Returning to the relationship between increased access to 
information and expert knowledge, consider the example of access to 
health information. Various web-based, health-related platforms 
provide plenty of information—but self-diagnoses are still tricky 
business due to the problems associated with reliability of information 
and its interpretation.192 In the end, the simple but important insight 
is this: information and knowledge are qualitatively different. The next 
Section further investigates what accounts for that difference. 
B. Expert Knowledge in Professional Advice-Giving 
This Section explores two interrelated questions: First, how is 
expert knowledge formed within knowledge communities—this process 
of knowledge formation qualitatively distinguishes knowledge from 
information—and second, how is expert knowledge disseminated by 
professionals as professional advice? 
The “modern idea of scientific expertise is compounded from two 
historically distinct elements: occupational expertise and the expertise 
claimed by scientists as privileged knowers of truths about the 
world.”193 Historians trace the distinction between theoretical 
knowledge and practical uses “as far back as Plato and Aristotle,” 
pinpointing the Enlightenment as the moment “the connection between 
theory and practice receive its modern formulation when, in addition to 
designating a set of truths about nature, theory also became a social 
good, a bedrock of knowledge on which enlightened society could 
engineer its own progress.”194 To that end, Post posits that “[a]ny 
 
Instead of using the oxymoron, we will refer to members of the public who have special 
technical expertise in virtue of experience that is not recognized by degrees or other 
certificates as ‘experience-based experts.’ 
 191. Prior, supra note 188, at 45.  
 192. See, e.g., Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 644 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]nformation obtained 
from chat rooms and tabloids cannot make up for the loss of individualized advice from a physician 
with many years of training and experience.”); see also Tyler Falk, This App Gives Free Medical 
Advice from Real Doctors, ZDNET (Apr. 11, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/this-app-
gives-free-medical-advice-from-real-doctors [https://perma.cc/8X8P-PKVQ] (“But from message 
boards to websites like WebMD, all of that information can be overwhelming and confusing, 
leaving you wondering if you have the common cold or cancer and unsure which advice to trust.”). 
 193. Thomas Broman, The Semblance of Transparency: Expertise as a Social Good and an 
Ideology in Enlightened Societies, 27 OSIRIS 188, 188 (2012). 
 194. Id. at 192. 
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modern society needs expert knowledge in order to survive and 
prosper.”195  
Different experts contribute to this project, with varying 
implications depending on their identities. While some worry about 
opaque bureaucracies filled with obscure policymaking experts, others 
study “professionals whom we deal with often in a face-to-face way.”196 
From the vantage point of expertise and democracy, these two are 
different in the way audiences perceive them as legitimate; therefore, 
they should be distinguished.197 My attention throughout this 
discussion is on the latter. The democracy problem of expert knowledge 
seems to be primarily one of political accountability rather than 
epistemic skepticism.198 Who determines the empirical foundations 
guiding public policy is a more complex question in a democracy than 
who gives advice, within a professional-client relationship, to solve an 
individual’s problem. The two are related but not the same, though they 
may make use of the same body of expert knowledge. 
It is worth noting that sociologists and others studying the 
processes of expert-knowledge formation themselves are engaged in a 
contested endeavor. STS scholarship arguably “has effectively 
deconstructed scientists’ claims that their research produces objective 
knowledge.”199 How far this epistemic relativism extends, in turn, is 
debated within that field. On the one hand, there has been a shift over 
time from epistemological questions to social questions. On the other 
hand, while finding the “sociological turn” in the literature helpful, 
some suggest that going back to the epistemological questions is also 
useful if the focus on “truth” is replaced with a focus on “expertise and 
experience.”200 Sociologists have identified three waves of scholarship, 
 
 195. POST, supra note 14, at ix. 
 196. Stephen Turner, What is the Problem with Experts?, 31 SOC. STUD. SCI. 123, 128 (2001) 
(“Whether this difference is significant is a question that I will leave open for the moment. But it 
points to some difficulties with the concept of expertise itself that need to be more fully explored.”). 
 197. Id. at 131:  
Thinking about the audiences of the expert – the audiences for whom the expert is 
legitimate and whose acceptance legitimates her claims to expertise – illuminates a 
puzzle in the discourse of the problem of expertise and democracy. Merton and 
Habermas, it appeared, were not talking about the same kind of experts. For Merton, 
the paradigm case was the physician, whose expert advice, say, to cut down on high-fat 
foods, we receive with ambivalence. 
 198. Cf. id. at 140 (suggesting that “the difficulties that have concerned theorists of democracy 
about the role of expert knowledge must be understood as arising not from the character of expert 
knowledge itself (and its supposed inaccessibility to the masses), but from the sectarian character 
of the kinds of expert knowledge that bear on bureaucratic decision-making”). 
 199. Broman, supra note 193, at 189. 
 200. Collins & Evans, supra note 189, at 236: 
One of the most important contributions of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) 
has been to make it much harder to make the claim: ‘Trust scientists because they have 
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the first having ended201 and the second and third ongoing and 
interacting.202 The focus of second wave scholarship is the 
deconstruction of knowledge, and the third wave’s response is a 
normative reconstruction of expertise.203 
Moreover, the contingency and dynamism of scientific 
knowledge is a complicating factor.204 For one, “around every core of 
‘expert’ knowledge is a penumbra, a domain in which core competence 
is helpful but not definitive, in which competent experts may disagree, 
and disagree because the questions in this domain cannot be decided in 
terms of the core issues that define competence.”205 I have elsewhere 
addressed related First Amendment problems that follow when we 
acknowledge that professional knowledge communities are not 
monolithic and there may be a range of professional insights that count 
as good advice.206 In addition, there is a temporal dimension. The 
knowledge community may have embraced new insights long before 
they are perceived as legitimate by the public. Or “the community may 
come to conclude that only a fragment of what was formerly held to be 
true was in fact true.”207 Here, too, I have previously addressed the First 
Amendment issues concerning tested and refuted as well as emergent 
and untested knowledge.208  
The next step, then, is to trace how expert knowledge is 
disseminated via professional advice. Sociologists have long explored 
what differentiates the professions. This endeavor has seen several 
iterations in which scholars refocused this question.209 Émile 
Durkheim’s initial quest was to examine the role of the professions in 
 
special access to the truth’. Our question is: ‘If it is no longer clear that scientists and 
technologists have special access to the truth, why should their advice be specially 
valued?’ 
 201. Id. at 239. They pinpoint the end of this wave to the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions and its fallout. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
202. Collins & Evans, supra note 189, at 240. 
203. Id. at 249–51. 
204. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 196, at 141 (“To be sure many things may pass, in the eye of 
the public, for science. Scientific views, and scientific consensuses, may of course change, and the 
public may well legitimate and accept scientific communities whose views later appear to be 
wrong.”). 
 205. Id. at 133. 
 206. See generally Haupt, supra note 10.  
 207. STEPHEN P. TURNER, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE 36 (2014). 
 208. Haupt, supra note 10, at 714–28. 
 209. For an overview, see Dana A. Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism 16–24 (UNC Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2676094, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2676094 
[https://perma.cc/P4KF-VNZF] (tracing the role of professionals in knowledge dissemination). 
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society.210 Subsequent generations of scholars building on Durkheim’s 
scholarship took a functionalist view and attempted to isolate the 
elements that are constitutive of the professions.211 Their core finding 
that self-regulation is necessary to develop and disseminate valuable 
professional expertise has been characterized as “portray[ing] the 
professions in an overwhelmingly positive light.”212 Andrew Abbott’s 
seminal work, The System of Professions,213 in turn, is part of the shift 
from the question of what occupation is a “profession” to how a 
professional group gains a professional monopoly and social status.214 
Though much of the later literature focused on the shortcomings of the 
professions and problems associated with monopoly status and 
professional self-regulation,215 the allocation of professional competence 
remains descriptively intact.  
One distinction between the professions and other occupations 
used by sociologists216 is the professions’ fusion of theory and practice.217 
Beyond specialized education, “professions claim their education 
presents a coherent body of theoretical doctrine that they apply in their 
work.”218 This conceptualization provides a link between the knowledge 
community’s insights and professional advice. The individual 
professional can be seen as the conduit between the knowledge 
community and the client.219  
Underlying this claim to authority is the presence of a shared 
methodology. In medicine and other professions, the scientific method 
is considered a guarantor for the validity of that profession’s knowledge 
basis.220 Interestingly, some scholars single out law as an exception: 
 
 210. See generally ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson 
trans., The Macmillan Company 4th ed. 1960). 
 211. Remus, supra note 209, at 21 (citing Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal 
Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1964); and William J. Goode, Community Within 
a Community: The Professions, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 194, 195–96 (1957)). 
 212. Id. at 21. 
 213. ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT 
LABOR (1988). 
 214. Remus, supra note 209, at 22. 
 215. See id. at 22–23. 
 216. See Broman, supra note 23, at 835:  
[S]ociologists have distinguished professions from other occupational groups by a now-
familiar set of criteria, which usually include (1) specialized and advanced education, 
(2) a code of conduct or ethics, (3) competency tests leading to licensing, (4) high social 
prestige in comparison to manual labor, (5) monopolization of the market in services, 
and (6) considerable autonomy in conduct of professional affairs. 
 217. Id. at 836. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1254. 
 220. Broman, supra note 23, at 836 n.3 (“In many cases, the validity of a profession’s 
theoretical knowledge is supposedly guaranteed by presenting it as the product of rigorous 
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“Lawyers also claim to base their practice on theory, but legal theory is 
not commonly regarded as ‘scientific.’ ”221 Moreover, “university law 
schools are not uniquely privileged in the formation of legal theory. 
Courts and legislatures also play a central role in this process.”222 
However, the distinction may place too much emphasis on the 
“scientific” aspect. As I have noted elsewhere, knowledge communities 
have shared ways of knowing and reasoning, so the methodology claim 
works without a claim to scientific methodology. In the context of the 
legal profession, I have suggested that legal doctrine serves a 
methodological function.223  
The link between expertise and authority extends to the 
professions in that “professional experts monopolize the ability to speak 
the truth, and indeed to define which statements can be examined as 
true or false. Needless to say, this gives experts tremendous authority 
in modern society.” 224 Yet, scholars also suggest that “there has been 
insufficient attention to the fact that the link between theory and 
practice has to be forged in discourse as a condition for the existence of 
the modern professions.”225 The basis for justifying professional 
authority “derives uniquely from a set of claims that scientific theory 
can and does guide practice and the institutional and educational 
structures developed in accordance with those claims.”226 “Scientific” in 
this sense denotes “presenting its theoretical apparatus as scientific—
that is, as empirical, objective, disinterested, methodologically rigorous, 
and so forth.”227  
Notwithstanding the normative criticism of the professions’ 
economic monopoly, descriptively, the knowledge asymmetry holds 
true. Decoupling the economic monopoly from the expertise asymmetry 
 
scientific method. This is most obviously the case with medicine, which boasts an enormous 
research establishment, but is also true of clinical psychology, engineering, economics, and a host 
of others.”). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 837 n.7. 
 223. See Claudia E. Haupt, Antidiscrimination in the Legal Profession and the First 
Amendment: A Partial Defense of Model Rule 8.4(g), 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 14–17 (2017) 
(discussing doctrine as methodology); see also Symposium, Developing Best Practices for Legal 
Analysis, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
 224. Broman, supra note 23, at 837 (emphasis omitted). 
225. Id.  
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. This is also where professional knowledge formation connects to knowledge production 
within the university. Id. at 837 n.7 (arguing “that university research departments constitute the 
core regions of professional discourse”). As I have noted elsewhere, “While outside of the 
professional-client relationship . . . the speech interests of professionals speaking to each other are 
similar to those underlying academic speech.” Haupt, supra note 4, at 1252 n.51. 
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in turn leads to a new view of licensing. Licensing, then, might be 
understood as a form of “public recognition of expertise.”228 
C. The Democratic Dimension of Professional Advice 
Licensing creates speaker inequality. Determining whether this 
seemingly undemocratic regulatory mechanism is compatible with 
democratic values demands a better understanding of the role of 
professionals, and more generally the role of expert knowledge they 
disseminate, in a democratic society. Issues surrounding the connection 
between democracy and professional expert knowledge are enduring 
and remain underexplored. Frederick Schauer contends that 
“[s]urprisingly little has been written about just what it is for a society 
(or any other collection of individuals) to know something, as opposed 
to what it is for an individual to know something.”229 As one political 
theorist puts it, “The role of those with specialized knowledge in modern 
democracy has been an unresolved issue since public intellectuals 
began to confront it in the Progressive Era.”230 And further, “[t]he 
professions have been neglected in political theory with negative 
consequences for the field in general and for the development of 
democratic theory in particular.”231 The following discussion explores 
what it means to add professional knowledge as a source of knowing in 
society. This discussion builds on Post’s exploration of democracy and 
expertise,232 with a specific focus on the professions.  
We assume equality in public discourse, and since public 
discourse tends to be the default when we think about free speech more 
generally, there is a strong democratic notion underlying the First 
Amendment. First Amendment jurisprudence is firmly committed to 
speaker equality in public discourse where one person’s opinion counts 
the same as another person’s facts. Many have bemoaned the ensuing 
spread of “fake news,” “junk science,” outright lies, and other distortions 
of the “truth.”233 Facts in contemporary public discourse are under 
 
 228. Cf. Turner, supra note 196, at 138. 
 229. Schauer, supra note 19, at 902 n.25. 
 230. ALBERT W. DZUR, DEMOCRATIC PROFESSIONALISM: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, IDENTITY, AND PRACTICE 4 (2008). For historical 
perspectives, see, for example, Eric H. Ash, Expertise and the Early Modern State, 25 OSIRIS 1 
(2010); and Broman, supra note 193, at 195–99. 
 231. DZUR, supra note 230, at 6.  
 232. See generally POST, supra note 14. 
 233. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 19. 
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siege; the Holmesian marketplace,234 it seems, has ceded to “post-
truth.”235 Nonetheless, this traditionally strong notion of equality 
continues to pervade our understanding of the First Amendment. The 
justification is based in democratic theory: a fundamental belief in 
equality of speakers and opinions in public discourse is necessary for 
equal participation, which in turn forms the basis of democracy.236  
But this assumption of speaker equality does not apply outside 
of public discourse where we continue to value facts and truth. One such 
area is professional speech. Most likely, patients and clients would want 
to talk to a “real” professional, trained and licensed to practice 
according to the standards of the profession, to obtain reliable advice. 
Professional advice-giving in the strict sense—communicating 
the insights of the knowledge community, within the professional-client 
relationship, for the purpose of giving professional advice—is decidedly 
not part of democratic public discourse.237 Professional insights are not 
up for debate in the marketplace;238 unlike in the marketplace, there is 
such a thing as disciplinary truth.239 And this disciplinary truth is 
enforced by the professional malpractice regime, where failure to meet 
the profession’s standard of care is sanctioned.240 Tied back to licensing, 
this distinction between professional speech and speech in public 
discourse explains Eugene Volokh’s assertion that “licensing 
requirements for professionals who give personalized advice should 
 
 234. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (asserting that 
“the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market”). 
 235. See, e.g., Amy B. Wang, “Post-truth” Named 2016 Word of the Year by Oxford Dictionaries, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/post-
truth-named-2016-word-of-the-year-by-oxford-dictionaries [https://perma.cc/WM6Y-83DA]. 
 236. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 21, at 26 (“[T]he reason for this equality of status in 
the field of ideas lies deep in the very foundation of the self-governing process. When men govern 
themselves, it is they—and no one else—who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness 
and danger.”). 
 237. Cf. POST, supra note 14, at xii (“Because the practices that produce expert knowledge 
regulate the autonomy of individual speakers to communicate, because they transpire in venues 
quite distant from the sites where democratic public opinion is forged, they seem estranged from 
most contemporary theories of the First Amendment.”). 
 238. Compare Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2374–75 (2018) (“[W]hen the government polices the content of professional speech, it can fail to 
‘preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.’ ” (quoting 
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014)), with id. at 2382–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]n suggesting that heightened scrutiny applies to much economic and social legislation, the 
majority pays those First Amendment goals a serious disservice through dilution.”).  
 239. POST, supra note 14, at 45. 
 240. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1286 (describing malpractice standards in the medical and 
legal contexts). 
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probably be constitutionally permissible; a licensing requirement for 
writing self-help books should be unconstitutional.”241  
Nonetheless, an emerging body of literature—much of it focused 
on the legal profession—discusses the potential benefits of a more 
democratic approach to professional education and the provision of 
professional services.242 Connecting the cost of professional services to 
access restrictions, some find professional monopolies increasingly 
difficult to justify.243 These considerations at first blush perhaps 
suggest that a new, more democratic and egalitarian approach might 
be desirable, and deregulation of professional licensing in the service of 
democratization might initially sound appealing to some. But “[w]hile 
many might laud the democratization of knowledge and the ideal of free 
and equal competition of ideas in the proverbial marketplace, there are 
certain lines that cannot be crossed if the sun is to continue to rise in 
the east.”244 In other words, “egalitarian principles cannot be allowed to 
run amok when it comes to how we understand truth or, if you will, 
expert knowledge.”245  
To capture these parameters, the absence of speaker equality 
when it comes to expert knowledge might be described as 
“undemocratic.”246 When professional knowledge is sought, “there has 
to be some rupture, at some point, of egalitarian norms.”247 That does 
not mean that expert knowledge has no role in democratic public 
discourse. In fact, it informs public discourse in a manner that can lead 
to more informed decisions of citizens without expert knowledge by 
providing expertise where it otherwise would not exist. Thus, precisely 
by virtue of its undemocratic nature, it has the potential to advance 
democratic public discourse. On this view, the presence of expert 
knowledge is better for public discourse than its absence.248 
 
 241. Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Unchartered Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 
1343 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
 242. See, e.g., Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1 (2012); Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing Legal Education, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1281 
(2013). 
 243. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981). 
 244. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Guardians of Knowledge in the Modern State: 
Post’s Republic and the First Amendment, 87 WASH. L. REV. 369, 369 (2012). 
 245. Id.  
 246. See id. at 375. 
 247. Id. at 370. 
 248. As Schauer has noted, “It should be obvious that factual truth and knowledge of it are 
important, even if these are not the only things that are important, and even if their importance 
does not necessarily trump other valuable attributes.” Schauer, supra note 19, at 901. He 
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Asserting that the presence of expert knowledge is good for a 
democratic society, however, is somewhat of a controversial statement. 
One might equally see it as a threat that results from the inability of 
nonexperts to understand, participate in, and control expertise and 
expert discourse.249 The problem fundamentally is one of equality.250 To 
the extent that democracy depends on the polity’s ability to decide for 
themselves what is true, the presence of expert knowledge creates 
either an abdication of popular control over expertise or a rejection of 
expert knowledge in favor of populism.251 This prompts the question: 
“Should the opinions of the many prevail over the knowledge of the 
few?”252 The unequal distribution of expert knowledge, moreover, may 
invite interventions, such as “egalitarianization through difference-
obliterating education or difference-obliterating access to expertise, for 
example through state subsidy of experts and the dissemination of their 
knowledge and advice.”253  
This, in turn, challenges the neutrality of the liberal state.254 The 
resulting twin problems are the “character of expert knowledge, which 
undermines liberalism, and the problem of the inaccessibility of expert 
knowledge to democratic control.”255 Another way to put it: “Should the 
political legitimacy of technical decisions in the public domain be 
maximized by referring them to the widest democratic processes, or 
should such decisions be based on the best expert advice? The first 
choice risks technological paralysis: the second invites popular 
opposition.”256 
 
elaborates as follows:  
Yet, even though we do not accept that truth and knowledge of it have a lexical priority 
over all other values, it seems relatively uncontroversial to assert that, in general, truth 
is, ceteris paribus, better than falsity, that knowledge is, ceteris paribus, better than 
ignorance, and that a society with more true belief is, ceteris paribus, better than one 
with less belief in the truth or than one with more beliefs that are actually false. 
Id. at 902. 
 249. Turner, supra note 196, at 123 (“In the writings of persons concerned with the political 
threat to democracy posed by the existence of expert knowledge, expertise is treated as a kind of 
possession which privileges its possessors with powers that the people cannot successfully control, 
and cannot acquire or share in.”). 
 250. Id.  
 251. Id. at 124 (describing these alternatives as “the dilemma of capitulation to ‘rule by 
experts’ or democratic rule which is ‘populist’—that is to say, that valorizes the wisdom of the 
people even when ‘the people’ are ignorant and operate on the basis of fear and rumor”). 
 252. Collins & Skover, supra note 244, at 372. 
 253. Turner, supra note 196, at 124. 
 254. See id. (“Thus it is a violation of the basic neutrality of the state, of the impartiality the 
liberal state must exhibit in the face of rival opinions in order to ensure the possibility of genuine, 
fair and open discussion.”).  
 255. Id. at 127. 
 256. Collins & Evans, supra note 189, at 235–36.  
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The First Amendment’s answer to this is to turn expert 
knowledge in public discourse into opinion equal to other opinions.257 
Does the state’s imprimatur by way of granting a license to 
professionals create a problem on the same reasoning? Licensing indeed 
creates speaker inequality. But as the normative exploration in the next 
Part illustrates, that is actually a good thing.  
III. LISTENER INTERESTS, SPEAKER INEQUALITY, AND FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES 
Two dimensions of First Amendment theory are particularly 
relevant to professional advice-giving: the role of listener interests and 
the role of speaker inequality. As already noted, both operate in the 
opposite direction in public discourse. This Part addresses them in turn. 
Moreover, to offer a comprehensive theoretical framing of professional 
advice-giving, the discussion of listener interest and speaker inequality 
takes fiduciary duties into account. Fiduciary duties respond to 
knowledge asymmetries, and the professional-client relationship is a 
typical fiduciary relationship.258 As one scholar puts it, “[A] fiduciary 
relationship is appropriate when the fiduciary is more expert than the 
entrusting party.”259 Though this may initially sound like a circular 
argument—a professional is a fiduciary because she is a professional—
the normative dimension proves that it is not. The professional is a 
 
 257. See POST, supra note 14, at 44.  
 258. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 20, at 1207 (explaining that “doctors, lawyers, and 
accountants have special relationships of trust and confidence with their clients” and describing 
these as “fiduciary relationships”).  
 Fiduciary theory is on the rise in a wide range of areas. See generally Matthew T. Bodie, 
Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819 (2017); Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in 
Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 993 (2017); Ethan J. Leib, Friends 
as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009). In public law, see, for example, Evan J. Criddle, 
Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 441 (2010); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 
117 (2006); Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A 
Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820 (2016); D. Theodore Rave, Fiduciary Voters?, 66 DUKE L.J. 331 (2016); 
and D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013). In international 
law, see, for example, Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 
YALE J. INT’L L. 331 (2009). With respect to the legal profession, see, for example, David J. Luban 
& W. Bradley Wendel, Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate History, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 337 (2017) (identifying fiduciary theory as an area that “may be fruitful for future legal 
ethics scholarship”). In the health law context, see, for example, Isaac D. Buck, Furthering the 
Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duty of Providers to the Payers of Medicare, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1043 
(2016); and Margaux J. Hall, A Fiduciary Theory of Health Entitlements, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1729 
(2014). 
 259. Buck, supra note 258, at 1071. 
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fiduciary because the values underlying the relationship demand 
imposition of fiduciary duties.  
Because fiduciary duties are incompatible with the values 
underlying the paradigmatic idea of speech in public discourse, they 
remain underexplored in the First Amendment context. One notable 
exception is Jack Balkin’s exploration of “information fiduciaries.”260 In 
the professional context, focusing on the flow of information from the 
professional to the client, we are dealing with “knowledge 
fiduciaries.”261 The values underlying the fiduciary relationship track 
and reinforce listener interests and speaker inequality in the 
professional context; they can thus be seen as normative corollaries. 
A. Listener Interests 
Conventionally, listener interests are not at the center of 
attention in First Amendment theory.262 Though the commercial speech 
doctrine was originally concerned with listener interests,263 its primary 
focus over time has shifted to the speaker.264 Moreover, the values 
underlying professional speech and commercial speech are 
fundamentally different.265 But listener interests are vitally important 
to professional speech where the very purpose of the professional-client 
relationship is to give accurate, comprehensive, and reliable advice to 
the client. 
Although the listener-centered perspective is not generally 
dominant, theoretical and doctrinal support for it does exist “when the 
expression occurs within a relationship in which content-based 
regulation can help improve the communicative discourse.”266 A 
listener’s deficit in “information, expertise, or power” vis-à-vis the 
speaker can create a relationship “where the speaker has greater (and 
sometimes even exclusive) informational access and listeners’ 
 
 260. See Balkin, supra note 20, at 1205–20 (introducing the concept of information fiduciaries 
and examining fiduciaries and the First Amendment).  
 261. My focus is on the information the client receives from the professional while Balkin’s is 
on the information the professional receives from the client. See id. at 1208. Nonetheless, the 
dynamics of the fiduciary relationship are the same. 
 262. See supra notes 13, 15 and accompanying text. 
 263. See Post & Shanor, supra note 7, at 172. 
 264. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). For an account of the shift in 
focus from listener to speaker, see, for example, Shanor, supra note 8. 
 265. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1264–68 (rejecting the analogy of professional speech to 
commercial speech); see also Post, supra note 8, at 23 (“Although the communication between a 
professional and her client might concern commercial matters, its regulation would almost 
certainly not be conceptualized as an issue of First Amendment commercial speech doctrine.”). 
 266. Norton, supra note 13, at 37. 
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opportunities for counterspeech and exit may be constrained.”267 Among 
the examples for speech within such relationships is “speech by 
professionals and other fiduciaries to their clients and beneficiaries 
where speakers’ insincerity and inaccuracy threaten especially grave 
harms to their listeners.”268  
Listener interests thus intersect in important ways with 
fiduciary duties. Anathema to the concept of public discourse, fiduciary 
duties exist between speaker and listener in professional speech: “The 
nature of the professional-client relationship gives rise to fiduciary 
duties. To bridge the knowledge gap, and to ensure the protection of the 
client’s decisional autonomy interests, the professional has to 
communicate all information necessary to make an informed decision 
to the client.”269  
Balkin distinguishes between the content of information and 
“the social relationships that produce” information.270 In the 
professional speech context, Daniel Halberstam likewise emphasizes 
the distinctive social relationship.271 My own approach diverges from 
Halberstam’s in the way I conceptualize the nature of expert knowledge 
as the formative element of the social relationship.272 Beyond the 
“boundedness” of the relationship, the distinctive marker in 
Halberstam’s model,273 the content of the underlying knowledge 
transfer—that is, accurately and comprehensively conveying the 
insights of the knowledge community—matters.274 There is no 
fundamental disagreement between these positions; rather, it is a 
question of emphasis. Fiduciary duties between professional and client, 
however, exist as a key feature of the professional-client relationship 
under both approaches.275 In general terms, “a fiduciary is one who has 
special obligations of loyalty and trustworthiness toward another 
 
 267. Id.  
 268. Id. (further noting that “relationships matter for free speech purposes in ways that 
sometimes support the choice to privilege listeners over speakers when their First Amendment 
interests are in tension”). 
 269. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1271 (citation omitted); cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210 (1985) 
(speaking of “fiduciary, person-to-person relationships”). 
 270. Balkin, supra note 20, at 1205. 
 271. Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional 
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999). 
 272. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1243 (“The professional-client relationship is typically 
characterized by an asymmetry of knowledge.”). 
 273. Halberstam, supra note 271, at 828–69 (discussing the constitutional status of “bounded 
speech practices”).  
 274. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1267 (arguing that Halberstam’s model of “bounded speech 
institutions” is incomplete because it “does not define the content of the boundedness”). 
 275. Halberstam, supra note 271, at 845; Haupt, supra note 4, at 1271. 
Haupt_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/31/2019 1:27 AM 
546 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2:501 
person.”276 In this relationship, “[t]he fiduciary must take care to act in 
the interests of the other person” who “puts their trust or confidence in 
the fiduciary, and the fiduciary has a duty not to betray that trust or 
confidence.”277 This results in the twin fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty: First, fiduciaries “must take care to act competently and 
diligently so as not to harm the interests of the principal, beneficiary, 
or client.”278 Secondly, they “must keep their clients’ interests in mind 
and act in their clients’ interests.”279 
Studies of trust in professionals, like studies of professionalism, 
have followed an uneven path. Scholars in the healthcare context, for 
example, trace a shift from a focus of medical ethics on professionalism 
to later scholarship questioning professionals’ trustworthiness.280 This 
development maps onto the STS literature’s skepticism of expert 
knowledge.281 The axiomatic proposition that “the physician-patient 
relationship is expected to be one of mutual trust”282 was followed by an 
era marked by skepticism of experts and trust in them. But “[w]e are 
now witnessing a robust revival of trust as a topic in discussions of 
medical ethics and professionalism.”283 Views of trust in professional 
relationships are also influenced by the conception of the market in 
professional services where the position “that optimal levels of trust or 
distrust will emerge through private ordering, without the assistance 
of law,” competes with the position “that trust is preferable to extensive 
monitoring and that certain legal regimes are needed to maximize the 
beneficial role of trust.”284 These positions mirror the competing 
economic positions on licensing.285 
Not all fiduciaries are professionals, as the corporate context 
shows.286 Although fiduciary duties exist between management and 
shareholders, there is no professional advice-giving relationship.287 
Closer to the line might be the trustee-beneficiary relationship, another 
paradigmatic fiduciary relationship. Finally, financial advisors—
 
 276. Balkin, supra note 20, at 1207. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 1207–08. 
 279. Id. at 1208. 
 280. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 469 (2002). 
 281. See supra Section II.B. 
 282. Hall, supra note 280, at 469 n.18 (citing TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 463–65 
(1951)). 
 283. Id. at 469. 
 284. Id. at 484. 
 285. See supra Section I.B.3. 
 286. Cf. Balkin, supra note 20, at 1207 (“Fiduciaries often perform professional services or else 
manage money or property for their principals, beneficiaries, or clients.”). 
 287. Cf. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligations, 37 DUKE 
L.J. 879, 915–18 (1988) (examining fiduciary duties in corporate law). 
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fiduciaries in light of the new fiduciary rule288—likely cross the line into 
the professional advice-giving realm.289 And the attorney-client 
relationship,290 like the doctor-patient relationship,291 is a paradigmatic 
professional-client relationship giving rise to fiduciary duties.  
But just as not all fiduciaries are professionals, not all 
professionals are fiduciaries. The medical context usefully illustrates 
contemporary debates concerning the existence and scope of 
professionals’ fiduciary duties. Under one account, based on “the 
existence of trust as a factual premise,” the law attaches specific rules 
to the relationship.292 Thus, the “various rights, responsibilities, and 
rules are premised on the strength and pervasiveness of trust in 
medical relationships.”293 Building on the patient’s trust in 
professionals and institutions, “the law seeks to enforce or promote 
physician or institutional behavior that meets the expectations that 
trusting patients bring to treatment relationships, and the law 
punishes violations of those trusting expectations.”294 Normatively, it 
thus seeks to ensure that professionals and institutions act more in 
accordance with patient expectations.295 One way to distinguish among 
professionals is to ask about the trust the public typically places in them 
as a matter of fiduciary duty; another is to ask the same question with 
respect to the existence of a regime of professional malpractice 
liability.296 Both aim to ensure that trust in professionals is met by their 
behavior. 
 
 288. Tara Siegel Bernard, Obama’s Fiduciary Rule, After a Delay, Will Go Into Effect, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2qTorEg [https://perma.cc/527Y-3QQA]; see Definition of the 
Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 
(Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, and 2550). 
 289. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, Now, Your Financial Advisers Will Have to Put You First 
(Sometimes), N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2sZRcxc [https://perma.cc/QC39-RB7X] 
(“When a doctor prescribes a drug, most people trust that it is the best course of treatment. The 
next time you seek financial advice, those professionals will be required to act in a way that 
approximates the patient-doctor relationship.”). 
 290. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 287, at 908 (“Paradigms of such [fiduciary] relationships 
include agent-principal, director-corporation, guardian-ward, lawyer-client, partner-fellow 
partner, and trustee-trust beneficiary relationships.”).  
 291. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why Physicians are Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12 IND. HEALTH 
L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2015) (noting that physicians “have greater knowledge and experience” than their 
patients). For a list of court decisions holding that physicians are fiduciaries, see id. at 3 n.5.  
 292. Hall, supra note 280, at 486. 
 293. Id. at 487. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id.  
 296. Without getting too far into current controversies in fiduciary theory, it is worth noting 
that there is some debate over “whether the duty of care and skill owed by a fiduciary is properly 
called a fiduciary duty.” Lionel Smith, Aspects of Loyalty 1 (July 27, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009894 [https://perma.cc/47UF-N5H8].  
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The presence of both fiduciary duties and professional 
malpractice liability has interesting conceptual implications. Courts 
and scholars treat tort liability and breach of fiduciary duty in different 
ways. Most importantly for present purposes, the two regimes are 
concerned with different categories of harm.297 Whereas the malpractice 
regime is concerned with bad advice, the fiduciary regime addresses 
betrayals of trust, and although the duty of care to act competently may 
be duplicative of the duty imposed by the professional malpractice 
standard, the two categories do not necessarily overlap.298 In the end, 
despite the fact that some courts doubt the fiduciary relationship or 
allow only a cause of action for malpractice but not for breach of 
fiduciary duty, the doctor-patient relationship should not be a hard case 
as far as fiduciary duties are concerned.299  
The listener’s interests extend to both the content of advice—
that is, its accuracy as determined by the professional knowledge 
community—and the ability to rely on that advice—that is, the 
trustworthiness of the professional dispensing that advice. Thus, the 
normative goals align: ensuring the professional’s competence and the 
client’s trust in the professional’s competence are at the heart of the 
professional-client relationship.  
B. Speaker Inequality 
Though equal in public discourse, speakers are necessarily—and 
appropriately—unequal in the professional relationship. One marker of 
inequality is the tort regime imposing liability for bad advice. Such a 
liability mechanism is absent in public discourse. Recall that in public 
discourse “traditional First Amendment doctrine systematically 
transmutes claims of expert knowledge into assertions of opinion.”300 As 
a consequence, though listeners may be more likely to trust a 
professional than a nonprofessional on a matter to which expertise may 
be relevant,301 they do not have the same recourse for harm caused by 
bad advice.302 This also means that professionals are free to diverge 
 
 297. They also differ with respect to the distribution of the burden of proof and the available 
remedies. See Mehlman, supra note 291, at 28. 
 298. See Caroline Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 557, 565 (2009) (“Trust and loyalty are what distinguish fiduciary from non-fiduciary 
relationships.”).  
 299. See Mehlman, supra note 291, at 10 (noting with surprise the authorities “that cast doubt 
on or reject outright the fiduciary nature of the patient-physician relationship”). 
 300. POST, supra note 14, at 44. 
 301. Cf. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1256. 
 302. See Haupt, supra note 10, at 681–82 (discussing medical advice dispensed to a general 
audience by a physician on a television program). 
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from what the profession considers good advice—something they may 
not do within the confines of the professional-client relationship.303  
Fiduciary duties normatively address the inequality between 
advice-giver and advice-recipient by aligning the professional’s 
behavior with the client’s expectations.304 While everyone is “treated as 
equally competent and equally able to fend for themselves in public 
discourse,” outside of public discourse, “the law drops its assumption 
that everyone is equally able, independent, and knowledgeable, and 
that everyone can equally fend for themselves.”305 This type of speaker 
inequality accounts for the knowledge asymmetry between professional 
and client. But there is another kind of speaker inequality: that 
between the professional speaker and the nonprofessional speaker.  
Individuals cannot place the same reliance on advice given by 
nonprofessional speakers, and they cannot hold them liable for harm 
caused by bad advice. Licensing provides a mechanism to make this 
distinction readable ex ante. Even outside of public discourse, in 
relationships that might look like advice-giving relationships, 
individuals cannot usually place the same reliance on nonprofessional 
advice obtained through one-on-one relationships with 
nonprofessionals, though context matters. On this point, it is 
instructive to contrast conversion therapy with advice dispensed in 
crisis pregnancy centers (“CPCs”).  
After the Ninth Circuit upheld California’s law prohibiting 
licensed mental health providers from offering conversion therapy, or 
“sexual orientation change efforts,” for minors against a First 
Amendment challenge under the Free Speech Clause,306 the same court 
denied a challenge under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses 
brought by licensed individuals who wanted to offer this type of 
treatment as a form of religious counseling.307 The court noted that the 
law applies only to “licensed mental health professionals acting within 
the confines of the counselor-client relationship.”308 In addition to the 
text, the legislative history supports this conclusion as “the law was 
aimed at practices that occur in the course of acting as a licensed 
professional.”309 According to the court, only the counselor-client 
relationship is within the law’s ambit: “The law regulates the conduct 
of state-licensed mental health providers only; the conduct of all other 
 
 303. Id. at 681. 
 304. See supra notes 292–295 and accompanying text. 
 305. Balkin, supra note 20, at 1215. 
 306. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 307. Welch v. Brown, 834 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 308. Id. at 1044 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229–30).  
 309. Id.  
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persons, such as religious leaders not acting as state-licensed mental 
health provider, is unaffected.”310 Further, the court noted that “even 
the conduct of state-licensed mental health providers is regulated only 
within the confines of the counselor-client relationship; in all other 
areas of life, such as religious practices, the law simply does not 
apply.”311 The professional speaker, in short, is unequal from other 
speakers, and licensing signals this difference. Obtaining advice from 
an individual outside of the professional-client relationship may be a 
form of advice, but it is not professional advice.312 
But the social relationship may be configured so as to evoke trust 
and reliance in a way that ought to only apply in a professional-client 
relationship. In obtaining advice from CPC counselors, women are 
sometimes led to believe they can rely on advice rendered there in the 
same way as medical advice.313 To avoid harm caused by such reliance, 
California enacted legislation that required CPCs to display certain 
disclosures.314 The law regulated licensed and unlicensed pregnancy-
counseling facilities. Specifically, it required licensed pregnancy-
related clinics to disseminate a notice informing patients of the 
existence of publicly-funded family-planning services, including 
contraception and abortion,315 and that the clinic was not licensed by 
the state of California.316 CPCs may be licensed or unlicensed 
facilities.317 The Ninth Circuit upheld the law against a First 
Amendment challenge,318 but in its decision in NIFLA v. Becerra, the 
 
 310. Id. at 1045 (emphasis omitted). I have elsewhere criticized the Pickup court for 
characterizing the speech as “conduct.” See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1294 (“Under my account, the 
activity regulated by the SOCE legislation . . . is speech. But as professional speech, it is a specific 
kind of speech.”). This disagreement, however, does not impact the role of licensing in the court’s 
analysis in Welch. 
 311. Welch, 834 F.3d at 1045. 
 312. There are, of course, line-drawing problems associated with this conceptual stance. I have 
elsewhere addressed the fact that knowledge communities are not monolithic, and often there is 
more than one professional opinion that is acceptable as professional advice. See Haupt, supra note 
10, at 675. Another problem concerns the line between different disciplines and professions with 
overlapping expertise on certain matters. 
 313. See, e.g., Aziza Ahmed, Informed Decision Making and Abortion: Crisis Pregnancy 
Centers, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Mar. 2015, at 51, 54; 
Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1350 (2014) (“Women 
who . . . are administered pregnancy tests by people in white lab coats are led to believe that 
medical professionals will give them accurate and impartial medical advice.”); B. Jessie Hill, Casey 
Meets the Crisis Pregnancy Centers, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Mar. 2015, at 59, 66 (noting that “[t]he 
counseling transaction itself looks like . . . [a] one-on-one, fiduciary relationship”). 
 314. Reproductive FACT Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123470–123473 (West 2016).  
 315. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 828–29 (9th Cir. 2016), 
rev’d sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 316. Id. at 829. 
 317. Id.  
 318. Id. at 845. 
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Supreme Court subsequently held the statute as drafted 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.319  
Two questions that were conflated in the NIFLA litigation by 
assuming the CPC disclosures were professional speech have to be kept 
separate. First, whether the speech in question is itself professional 
speech. (I have argued elsewhere that it is not.320) The second question 
is whether the state has a sufficient interest in informing women about 
the nature of the services rendered by CPCs. The normative relevance 
of both questions is that professional advice-giving both evokes and 
depends on client trust. The client must be able to trust that the 
professional gives competent, accurate, and comprehensive advice 
consistent with the insights of the knowledge community. 
Distinguishing between licensed and unlicensed providers accounts for 
the level of trust patients can reasonably place in the advice obtained. 
The NIFLA dissent correctly understands the role of licensing as an 
element of the larger regulatory framework governing professional 
advice-giving.321 Similarly, the professional malpractice tort regime and 
fiduciary duties impose real consequences on some speakers and not 
others, making inequality among speakers legally relevant by tying 
advice to a body of professional knowledge generated by the knowledge 
community.  
Speaker inequality as a normative matter, then, accounts for 
expert knowledge situated with advice-giving professionals whose 
competence licensing makes a prerequisite that is readable ex ante, and 
whose liability for bad advice ex post is ensured through professional 
malpractice liability and who are bound to further client interests by 
fiduciary duties. Thus normatively, in the end, the interests underlying 
all of them align.  
 
 319. 138 S. Ct. at 2378.  
 320. Claudia Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 185, 189 (2018): 
In classifying the CPC disclosures as professional speech, the Ninth Circuit defined 
professional speech too broadly. The content of the disclosures in NIFLA was too far 
removed from expert knowledge to be properly attributed to the realm of professional 
expertise. The disclosures dealt with publicly funded reproductive healthcare and state 
licensing, regulatory frameworks that are not themselves subject to expert knowledge. 
 321. 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting):  
Even during the Lochner era, when this Court struck down numerous economic 
regulations concerning industry, this Court was careful to defer to state legislative 
judgments concerning the medical profession. The Court took the view that a State may 
condition the practice of medicine on any number of requirements, and physicians, in 
exchange for following those reasonable requirements, could receive a license to practice 
medicine from the State. Medical professionals do not, generally speaking, have a right 
to use the Constitution as a weapon allowing them rigorously to control the content of 
those reasonable conditions. 
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IV. RETHINKING PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
Having argued that professional speech protection and 
professional licensing are complementary rather than in conflict, this 
Part addresses how this theory of professional speech and professional 
licensing cashes out in terms of First Amendment doctrine before 
surveying the reconceptualized legal framework governing professional 
advice-giving and its application.  
This Part then returns briefly to professional licensing reform. 
There may be good reasons yet to question currently existing 
professional licensing regimes. Simultaneously acknowledging the 
shortcomings of existing licensing regimes and recognizing the abstract 
need for licensing in general are not incompatible. But rather than 
attempting to alter licensing regulation through a First Amendment 
lens based on the theoretically feeble assertion that speech protection 
and licensing are irreconcilable, rethinking professional licensing 
should focus on the states’ police powers. Licensing ought to be tailored 
so as to protect clients’ health, safety, and welfare by ensuring 
professionals’ competence.  
A. Professionals and the First Amendment  
Professional speech is a unique category of speech.322 It is not 
the expression of opinions in public discourse, nor is it commercial 
speech. Professional speech reflects the shared knowledge of 
professionals belonging to a knowledge community that is 
communicated from professional to client within the confines of a 
professional-client relationship. Several implications for First 
Amendment doctrine and for the legal framework of professional 
advice-giving that change the analysis of professional speech and 
licensing cases follow from this theory, as this Section will demonstrate. 
1. Doctrinal Implications 
Under this theory of professional speech, several First 
Amendment doctrines applicable in public discourse do not apply in the 
context of professional speech. The requirements of content and 
viewpoint neutrality under Reed v. Town of Gilbert323 are inapplicable, 
 
 322. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1269. But see Ashutosh Bhagwat, When Speech Is Not “Speech,” 
78 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 882 (2017) (arguing against First Amendment coverage of professional speech 
but noting that “[t]he coverage problem here is much more complex and debatable than in . . . other 
examples”); Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 
67 (2016) (arguing against a distinctive approach to professional speech). 
 323. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
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as is protection of false speech under United States v. Alvarez.324 
Moreover, in the professional speech context, there are justifications for 
prohibiting false and misleading speech, for imposing an informed 
consent requirement, and for compelled disclosures. And finally, prior 
restraint doctrine does not apply. I will briefly discuss these doctrinal 
consequences in turn. 
Content and viewpoint neutrality are inapposite to professional 
speech.325 The Eleventh Circuit most recently disregarded the 
fundamental difference between public discourse and professional 
speech in its en banc decision in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida.326 
Despite reaching the correct result in striking down on First 
Amendment grounds a Florida law that prohibited doctors from asking 
their patients about gun ownership as a matter of course, the analytical 
approach applying the requirement of content neutrality327 misses the 
distinctive nature of professional speech. Rather, “in order to preserve 
the values underlying professional speech—ensuring the accuracy and 
reliability of professional advice for the benefit of the client who 
depends on it to make important decisions—the First Amendment may 
not require state regulation to ignore the content of that advice.”328 The 
client, in short, depends on a distinction between good and bad 
professional advice—a distinction that a strict regime of content and 
viewpoint neutrality would obliterate. But “the value of professional 
speech to the client critically depends on its content.”329 The tort regime 
of professional malpractice liability, to take a particularly salient 
example, is based on the content of speech, and the First Amendment 
provides no defense against malpractice claims.330 Thus, “content 
regulation . . . ensure[s] that professionals give their clients, to whom 
they owe a fiduciary duty, comprehensive and accurate advice.”331 On 
the same reasoning, lies as well as false and misleading speech do not 
enjoy First Amendment protection in the context of professional 
speech.332  
 
 324. 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 325. Haupt, supra note 163, at 151. 
 326. 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 327. Id. at 1300 (framing the decision in terms of content neutrality). 
 328. Haupt, supra note 163, at 152. 
 329. Id. at 172. 
 330. Even the NIFLA majority agrees, though it argued that this is because professional 
malpractice is conduct. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 
2361, 2373 (2018) (noting that torts for professional malpractice fall under the state’s purview to 
regulate professional conduct). 
 331. Haupt, supra note 163, at 172.  
 332. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985); cf. Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 (1992) (explaining that the state can require 
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With respect to informed consent, “imposing an informed 
consent requirement does not technically restrict the professional’s 
First Amendment rights if appropriate disclosure is considered a part 
of medically necessary information flow within the doctor-patient 
relationship.”333 Scholars continue to explore the margins of what the 
state can require as a matter of informed consent.334 However, in light 
of the underlying interests, informed consent is necessary for the 
patient’s decisional autonomy. Thus, unlike in public discourse, the 
imposition of such a requirement is justified.335 
In public discourse, compelled disclosure requirements are 
strongly disfavored “because such requirements are understood to 
infringe the autonomy of speakers in determining the content of their 
speech.”336 But in the professional speech context, autonomy interests 
operate differently than in public discourse: “The professional not only 
speaks for herself, but also as a member of a learned profession” which 
leads to “a unique autonomy interest in communicating her message 
according to the standards of the profession.”337 Consequently, 
compelled disclosures in the professional speech context do not 
implicate the same values as in public discourse.  
Finally, a strong presumption against prior restraints on speech 
is a hallmark of public discourse.338 As already mentioned, the question 
of prior restraints created by professional licensing is the subject of 
considerable disagreement. Whereas the Ninth Circuit denied that 
licensing creates prior restraints,339 some scholars assert that licensing 
creates particularly troublesome prior restraints.340 But neither of those 
positions accurately captures the relationship between prior restraints 
and licensing. First Amendment scholars have long examined the 
values served by prior restraint doctrine.341 The central concern is 
 
that truthful and not misleading information be provided without running afoul of the First 
Amendment). 
 333. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1289. 
 334. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 313; Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First 
Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939; Nadia N. Sawicki, 
Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions, 50 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11 (2016); Sonia M. Suter, The First Amendment and Physician Speech in 
Reproductive Decision Making, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Mar. 2015, at 22. 
 335. As it does with professional malpractice, the NIFLA majority considers informed consent 
a form of conduct. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. 
 336. Post, supra note 8, at 27. 
 337. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1272. 
 338. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 339. See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra notes 135–136 and accompanying text. 
 341. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 
MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 
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suppression of speech.342 But bad professional advice is properly 
suppressed, since it serves neither the client’s or patient’s nor the 
professional’s interests.343 The malpractice regime sanctions bad advice 
ex post, but ex ante suppression of speech equally furthers the values 
underlying the professional-client relationship. In other words, 
suppression of incompetent advice is normatively desirable in the 
professional context. And a licensing regime tailored to the goal of 
ensuring competent advice-giving serves this interest. 
2. The Framework of Professional Advice-Giving 
Because professional speech protection and professional 
licensing share the same goal—ensuring the availability of competent 
and reliable advice for clients or patients—state involvement in 
licensing supports the framework of professional advice-giving rather 
than undermines it. Key components of this framework are First 
Amendment protection of professional speech, professional malpractice 
liability, fiduciary duties within the professional-client relationship, 
and the permissibility of professional licensing.344  
The entire regulatory framework has the goal of ensuring the 
flow of accurate and comprehensive advice from the knowledge 
community through the individual professional to the client.345 To that 
end, the First Amendment protects only good advice as determined by 
the standards of the profession, taking into account that a range of 
knowledge may constitute good advice.346 Professional speech 
protection and professional malpractice liability thus form two sides of 
the same coin.347 
From the perspective of the client, the tort regime provides 
recourse for harm caused by bad advice.348 In this scenario, the First 
Amendment and the tort regime draw on the same body of 
knowledge.349 This conceptual point is relatively simple, but important: 
“Professionals may be held liable for ‘unprofessional’ speech—that is, 
 
(1983); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment 
Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984). 
 342. Post, supra note 8, at 33 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973)). 
 343. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1270–73 (discussing professional and decisional autonomy 
interests). 
 344. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1279 .  
 345. See id. at 1267. 
 346. Haupt, supra note 10, at 675. 
 347. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1285. 
 348. See Haupt, supra note 10, at 707–10 . 
 349. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1279. 
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speech within the professional-client relationship, for the purpose of 
providing professional advice, that fails accurately to communicate the 
knowledge community’s insights.”350 This understanding is also 
consistent with contemporary torts scholarship.351 
Connecting disciplinary truth and malpractice liability in a 
sense is distinctly Foucauldian: “Discipline is on the one hand ‘the 
maintenance of a set of rules and the punishment meted out for their 
infringement.’ But at the same time it is also ‘a branch of 
knowledge.’ ”352 Professional speech protection and the imposition of 
malpractice liability are complementary.353 Only good advice ought to 
be protected by the First Amendment, and only bad advice is subject to 
malpractice liability. Fiduciary duties lend normative support to the 
design of the professional-client relationship. But this legal framework 
does not obviate the need for licensing. Most obviously, the temporal 
aspect is fundamentally different: licensing happens ex ante, tort 
liability ex post. In order for a tort claim to succeed, the client must 
have suffered harm. Licensing, by contrast, anticipates the abstract 
possibility of harm.354  
Assessing the likelihood and potential extent of harm is a 
necessarily fact-specific and profession-specific inquiry. In National 
Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, the Ninth Circuit 
discussed harm to clients in its rational basis analysis.355 The court 
noted that the state “first regulated psychology because it ‘recognized 
the actual and potential consumer harm that can result from the 
unlicensed, unqualified or incompetent practice of psychology.’ ”356 It 
then examined the law’s provisions in relation to potential harms that 
may arise in the course of practice, concluding that “[r]egulating 
psychology, and through it psychoanalysis, is rational because it is 
within the state’s police power to regulate mental health treatment.”357 
Similarly, scholars of the legal profession call for a focus on harm when 
 
 350. Id. at 1278–79. 
 351. See, e.g., Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1206 
(2012). 
 352. Thomas Broman, Rethinking Professionalization: Theory, Practice, and Professional 
Ideology in Eighteenth-Century German Medicine, 67 J. MOD. HIST. 835, 837 (1995) (quoting Jan 
Goldstein, Foucault Among the Sociologists: The ‘Disciplines’ and the History of the Professions, 23 
HIST. & THEORY 170, 178 (1984)). 
 353. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1285 (discussing First Amendment protection and malpractice 
liability as two sides of the same coin). 
 354. But see Svorny, supra note 185 (arguing that instead of protecting patients, licensing 
increases the power of physicians to the detriment of patient care).  
 355. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 
1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 356. Id. (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2900 (West 2018)). 
 357. Id.  
Haupt_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/31/2019 1:27 AM 
2019] LICENSING KNOWLEDGE 557 
considering “full-scale licensing structures,” suggesting that they “are 
desirable only when harms are ‘demonstrated or easily 
recognizable.’ ”358 
B. Professional Licensing Reform 
It may well be desirable to refashion licensing regimes to 
establish a more immediate nexus between licensing and competence, 
with the goal of preventing harm to clients.359 But theoretically and 
doctrinally speaking, the First Amendment is not the way to get there. 
The states’ police powers, by contrast, provide a sound route toward a 
tighter fit between the regulatory regime and the potential harm to be 
averted. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in National Ass’n for the 
Advancement of Psychoanalysis provides one example.360 The D.C. tour 
guide case—though misguided in its First Amendment lens—illustrates 
this approach,361 which was also endorsed by the district court in the 
Charleston tour guide case.362 But fashioning a closer nexus between 
licensing and harm, to reiterate, is unrelated to First Amendment 
concerns. 
A focus on the interplay of harm, the level of professional 
competence necessary to avoid it, and the demands of licensing 
requirements would likely result in a redesign of various existing 
regimes. As one commentator notes: “Because the use of occupational 
licensing varies across states for the same occupation, the large 
variations in licensing requirements suggest that this form of 
regulation is not always strictly related with safety or quality concerns 
over individuals’ ability to do the tasks related to the occupation.” 363 
Redesigning or better tailoring can potentially provide significant relief 
 
 358. Rhode, supra note 243, at 96 (quoting BENJAMIN SHIMBERG, BARBARA F. ESSER & DANIEL 
H. KRUGER, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES 222 (1973)). 
 359. Cf. Bell, supra note 61, at 128 (suggesting that states should “promulgate substantive 
regulations that are reasonably related to braiding and natural styling”). 
 360. See supra notes 356–357 and accompanying text. 
 361. See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 363. Kleiner, supra note 26, at 11:  
For example, only seven states license dental assistants and thirteen states license 
locksmiths. Even for states that do license the same occupation, the requirements to 
obtain a license can vary widely. Iowa requires 490 days of education and training to 
become a licensed cosmetologist, but the national average is 372 days, and New York 
and Massachusetts require only 233 days. Training requirements also are frequently 
unrelated to issues of health and public safety. To illustrate, training requirements in 
Michigan take 1,460 days for an athletic trainer, but only twenty-six days for an 
emergency medical technician. 
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to the problem. But it would be up to state legislatures in the first 
instance to act.  
Critics of licensing suggest a range of “market” instruments that 
would replace licensure with solutions ranging from voluntary 
certification to customer review and ratings systems akin to Yelp.364 
Certification involves an exam and subsequent certification of a specific 
level of skill or knowledge by a government agency or private actor.365 
And as an even less restrictive alternative, registration requires 
application to be included in an official roster.366  
For some occupations, this might make good sense—but some 
proposals go too far. In the medical context, one economist asserts: “The 
premise that patients’ health and safety are protected by state medical 
professional licensing is without basis. Instead, patients are protected 
by private credentialing, privileging, certification, brand name, medical 
professional liability insurance oversight, and other efforts to reduce 
liability.”367 However, as the previous discussion has shown, the 
medical example is particularly unlikely to provide a suitable basis to 
argue for deregulation since professional advice-giving is a core element 
of the doctor-patient relationship and there is a significant risk of 
causing considerable harm.368 A reliable ex ante mechanism of 
distinguishing competent from incompetent advice may not be 
necessary for all occupations, but it is necessary for healthcare 
 
 364. See id. at 21–22 (proposing that certification should substitute licensing for some 
occupations); Kry, supra note 7, at 891 (arguing for certification). The D.C. Circuit in the tour 
guides case concluded that “fatal to the District’s regulatory scheme is the existence of less 
restrictive means to accomplish its interests.” Edwards, 755 F.3d at 1009. Among those 
alternatives would be “a voluntary certification program—under which guides who take and pass 
the District’s preferred exam can advertise as ‘city-certified guides.’ ” Id. The district court in the 
Charleston tour guide case likewise contemplated various alternatives to licensing, including 
“reliance on the free-market, particularly given the public’s use of travel review websites” and “a 
voluntary certification program,” Billups, 194 F. Supp. 3d at 470, but ultimately dismissed these 
alternatives as insufficient. Id. at 477–78. 
 365. Kleiner, supra note 26, at 8:  
For instance, in many states travel agents and car mechanics are certified but not 
licensed. This process allows for competition for services, as anyone can legally perform 
the work, but it protects the right of the title for those in the occupation. For example, 
only workers who have passed through a Chartered Financial Analyst program and 
exam can use that title, but others can provide financial advice for a fee as long as they 
do not use the title “chartered financial analyst.” 
 366. Id. 
 367. Svorny, Beyond Medical Licensure, supra note 60, at 29; see also Sawicki, supra note 76, 
at 287 n.7:  
Economists, in particular, have long made similar arguments, questioning the value of 
licensure and self-regulation in highly insulated and self-protective professions, like 
medicine. These authors and others suggest that medical quality and patient safety 
could be better safeguarded through market-based solutions that close the information 
gap between physicians and consumers. 
368. See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text. 
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providers. Thus, “it is highly unlikely that the current system of medical 
licensure would be abandoned in the foreseeable future.”369  
The same is likely true for the legal profession, despite the fact 
that prominent scholars have contemplated alternatives to licensing. 
Rhode, for example, explores voluntary certification or mandatory 
registration.370 In addition, she raises the possibility that “a state could 
grant licenses to all lay practitioners who registered with an 
appropriate agency.”371 But to the extent that these alternatives are 
offered to avoid conflict with the First Amendment, this discussion has 
demonstrated that this particular concern is largely unfounded. 
CONCLUSION 
Building on a concept of the professions as knowledge 
communities, this Article demonstrates that the interests underlying 
professional speech protection and professional licensing align. Both 
professional speech protection and professional licensing, properly 
conceptualized, ultimately share the goal of guarding the integrity of 
professional knowledge—as defined by the knowledge community—
communicated by the professional to the client for the client’s benefit. 
The central role of listener interests and speaker inequality 
distinguishes professional speech from speech in public discourse. 
These interests are reflected in the fiduciary duties that exist between 
professional and client.  
The First Amendment, it turns out, is a poor vehicle to challenge 
professional licensing regimes. Consequently, courts should reject novel 
litigation strategies seeking to enlist the First Amendment in 
deregulation of professional licensing. There may be good reasons to 
oppose licensing for some occupations, but asserting a violation of the 
First Amendment is not one of them. 
 
 
 369. Sawicki, supra note 76, at 287 n.7.  
 370. Rhode, supra note 243, at 96. 
 371. Id. 
